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CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT: AN
ARCHITECTURAL SOLUTION TO DIGITALLY
EXPANDING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE
Evan Hess*
As the internet blossomed into ubiquity, piracy mushroomed with it. To
control the threat, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA). The DMCA created a number of safeguards for copyright
holders. But the DMCA purposely ignored whether copyright holders could
restrict future transfers of their legally purchased work—a concept known
in physical property as the “first sale doctrine.” As a result, copyright
holders began using licenses to control future transfers of their digital
property.
This was not the first time copyright holders have attempted to gain
greater control over their work. The history of copyright law demonstrates
a pattern of struggle between competing interests—with public access to
creative works on one side and the need for incentive to create on the other
side. Over time, courts and legislators have chosen different responses to
this struggle. Each has encountered varying levels of success. But all have
dealt exclusively in physical property.
The world of physical property is different from that of digital property
for two reasons. In the physical world, it is difficult and costly to duplicate
works, and over time, these works degrade. By contrast, in the digital
world, copying a book, a song, or a movie requires only a couple of
keystrokes and a mouse click. Additionally, copying a digital file does not
affect its quality. In light of these differences, scholars have offered a
number of solutions, focusing on the difference in copying difficulty
between physical and digital property. This Note examines the history of
copyright law to understand the various solutions available to lawmakers
when dealing with the threat of piracy and considers the possibility of a
solution focusing instead on the degradation difference between physical
and digital property.

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2007, Drew University. I
would like to thank my family, friends, and Jennifer for their love and support. I am also
grateful to Professor Olivier Sylvain for his insight, guidance, and advice.
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INTRODUCTION
It is easy to identify tangible property’s digital counterparts. For
example, a paperback novel transforms into an e-book and a phonorecord
becomes an MP3 file. But simply because these digital counterparts fulfill
the same role as their tangible ancestors does not mean that they share all of
their physical predecessors’ characteristics. The differences between digital
property and its physical antecedents become clear when one considers the
two types of property through business and legal lenses. One example can
be found in the rental-by-mail and online streaming media company
Netflix.
On September 18, 2011, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings followed an
unpopular price change for his company with a blog post apologizing to his
customers.1 During this apology, Hastings announced a company split.2
The Netflix name would be used solely for streaming movies over the
internet, while the DVD-by-mail service that had made Netflix a household
name would be renamed “Qwikster.”3 Netflix and Qwikster would operate
as completely separate entities.4 As soon as three weeks later, one million
customers canceled their subscriptions to Netflix,5 and the company’s stock
price plummeted more than 60 percent.6 As a result, Hastings abandoned
the idea of Qwikster, and Netflix remained the “one place to go for
streaming and DVDs.”7
Many customers expressed outrage at Hastings’ move.8 Journalists
characterized it as a “corporate debacle[]”9 and drew comparisons to “a list
1. See Reed Hastings, An Explanation and Some Reflections, NETFLIX (Sept. 18, 2011,
8:59 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/explanation-and-some-reflections.html.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. Curt Finch, Netflix Kills Qwikster After 1 Million Subscribers Leave, INC. (Oct. 11,
2011), http://www.inc.com/tech-blog/netflix-kills-qwikster-after-1-million-subscribers-leave
.html.
6. Stu Woo, Under Fire, Netflix Rewinds DVD Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2011, at A1.
7. Reed Hastings, DVDs Will Be Staying at Netflix.com, NETFLIX (Oct. 10, 2011, 5:00
AM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/10/dvds-will-be-staying-at-netflixcom.html.
8. Finch, supra note 5.
9. Id.
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of companies with embarrassing flip-flops,” including Coca-Cola Co.’s
“New Coke.”10 But industry commentators believe the relationship
between Netflix and its wholesalers (i.e., movie copyright owners) drove
Hastings’ decision.11
Movie copyright owners and secondary-market businesses, like Netflix,
occupy inverse positions when dealing with physical property and with
digital property.12 Namely, when dealing in physical property, secondarymarket businesses are afforded leverage through the first sale doctrine.13 If
the copyright owners do not reach a reasonable agreement with secondarymarket businesses, these businesses can purchase the property elsewhere
and then lend or rent it.
By contrast, because no first sale doctrine presently exists for digital
property,14 movie copyright holders retain considerable leverage in
negotiations over the license agreements reached with secondary-market
businesses for digital property.15 If secondary-market businesses cannot
reach a reasonable license agreement with copyright owners, there is no
legal alternative to lending or renting the property.16 Any Netflix
subscriber knows that there is an essential difference between the physical
DVD service and the digital streaming service: “[t]he DVD section has a
better selection, with newer releases.”17
This imbalance and its effects are not limited to the film industry. Other
online streaming media services have suffered from the current digital
property regime. Pandora, a streaming music service, has never turned a
profit—reporting losses exceeding $105 million for the five fiscal years
between February 2007 and January 2012.18 Additionally, “Spotify is
likely to report a loss [in 2012] . . . . Last year, the company lost about $60
million.”19 And on April 11, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice “accused

10. Woo, supra note 6.
11. See Nick Wingfield & Brian Stelter, A Juggernaut Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
2011, at B1; Henry Blodget, With All Due Respect to Reed Hastings, the Netflix-Qwikster
Split Sucks for Customers, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider
.com/2011-09-19/tech/30174644_1_reed-hastings-netflix-ceo-netflix-competitors; Eliot Van
Buskirk, Netflix-Qwikster Split: It’s the Licensing, Silly, WIRED (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:02 PM),
http://www.wired.com/business/2011/09/netflix-qwikster-split-licensing/.
12. See Buskirk, supra note 11.
13. See infra Part I.A.1.
14. See infra notes 323–42 and accompanying text.
15. See Buskirk, supra note 11.
16. See Blodget, supra note 11 (explaining that “[t]o rent a DVD, Netflix need merely
buy it . . . . To stream a show or movie, meanwhile, Netflix has to pay a direct licensing
fee.” (emphasis added)).
17. Id.
18. Mark Rogowsky, Pandora Finds Little Profit in Reinventing Radio, FORBES (Sept.
10, 2012, 4:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2012/09/10/pandora-findslittle-profit-in-reinventing-radio/.
19. Evelyn M. Rusli & Michael J. De La Merced, Spotify’s Financing Is Said To Lift
Value to $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/05/17/spotify-is-raising-millions-in-a-deal-that-would-value-it-at-4-billion/.
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Apple, Inc. and five of the nation’s largest publishers . . . of conspiring to
raise e-book prices . . . . [to] ensure that e-books are profitable.”20
The only analogous online streaming media service to report
profitability, Hulu, is a joint venture of ABC, Fox, and NBC.21 Hulu’s
contracts with network providers are unique because Hulu does not pay for
any of the costs of running advertisements—not even bandwidth costs.22 In
addition, Hulu is the only online streaming media service to maintain
advertisements despite user’s payment of a subscription fee.23 Hulu’s
internet service draws viewers away from TV and to the internet
undercutting cable, satellite, and telecom providers who are a steady
revenue stream to television networks to support the cost of producing
content.24 As a result, other content copyright holders like Viacom
removed The Daily Show and The Colbert Report from Hulu because
having this new content available on Hulu steered customers away from
Viacom’s Comedy Central website, reducing Viacom’s possible direct
advertisement revenue.25 These actions lead to questions regarding Hulu’s
continued profitability.26
In addition to the effects on online streaming media outlets themselves,
the lack of a digital analogue to the first sale doctrine has had startling
effects on the private users of these outlets. In July 2009, Amazon
unexpectedly deleted digital versions of George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal
Farm that customers had previously purchased.27 Reports suggested that
this deletion followed earlier removal of digital versions of Harry Potter
books and Ayn Rand novels.28 More recently, Barnes & Noble reportedly
denied a customer access to a purchased digital book purportedly because

20. Thomas Catan, Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg & Chad Bray, U.S. Alleges E-book Scheme,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2012, 10:58 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
4444604577337573054615152.html.
21. Brian Stelter, Is Hulu Boxed In?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, at BU1.
22. Erik Sherman, Hulu Makes a Profit. Video Content Owners? Not So Much,
CBSNEWS (Apr. 2, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-43443210
/hulu-makes-a-profit-video-content-owners-not-so-much/.
23. Compare Why Are There Ads in Hulu Plus?, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/support/
article/20356372 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013), with Pandora One, PANDORA, http://
www.pandora.com/one (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (“Pandora One is completely free of any
sort of advertising.”), Spotify Premium, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/ (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) (“No ads & no commitment.”), and Ads and Pop-ups When Streaming to
Your PC or Mac, NETFLIX, http://support.netflix.com/en/node/1891#gsc.tab=0 (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013) (“Netflix does not push advertisements to members using our service.”).
24. See Brian Stelter and Brad Stone, Successes (and Some Growing Pains) at Hulu,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B1.
25. Sherman, supra note 22.
26. See id.
27. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle. (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1.
28. See id.
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the credit card the customer purchased the digital book with had expired
long after the purchase.29
These instances of copyright owners’ attempts to control their works
after distribution are not new. In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a
similar problem in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.30 This Note looks to that
decision, its reasoning, and the realities that surrounded it for guidance in
restoring the balance between the copyright holders, the secondary market,
and end users. By focusing on an element present in the physical-property
marketplace, degradation, this Note argues that the balance between
copyright holders, the secondary market, and end users may be restored.
Part I of this Note provides background information on the origin of
copyright law, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act31 (DMCA). Next, Part II explores previous scholarship regarding the
first sale doctrine in digital property, proposed solutions, and where
available, the governmental response to these proposals. Finally, Part III
offers the opportunity to introduce degradation into digital property to
reestablish a balance between copyright holders and the secondary market.
I. COPYRIGHT’S FOUNDATION AND ITS SUPPORTING POLICIES
The Founders so valued the production of creative works that they
provided for their protection in the Constitution: “The Congress shall have
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”32 The importance of copyright
protection persisted, as the first Congress enacted a copyright statute in
1790,33 and copyright protection by federal statute remains in force today.34
Many scholars interpret the Founders’ desire “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts” to be a balancing test.35 The public’s interest in
29. See Laura Northrup, Here’s Why Digital Rights Management Is Stupid and Anticonsumer, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 26, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/11/26/heres-whydigital-rights-management-is-stupid-and-anti-consumer/.
30. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
31. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. See Maurice J. Holland, A Brief History of American Copyright Law, in THE
COPYRIGHT DILEMMA 3, 11 (Herbert S. White ed., 1978); see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, 1 Stat. 124 .
34. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
35. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Systems, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970) (“Macaulay’s
statement that copyright was ‘a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers’
reveals the conflict of interest between the reader and the book producer that underlies much
of the discussion about copyright law.” (footnote omitted)); Gerald Dworkin, Copyright, the
Public Interest and Freedom of Speech: A U.K. Copyright Lawyer’s Perspective, in
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES ¶ 7.03, at 154
(Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005) (“Copyright and the public interest are
inextricably linked. All copyright systems seek to strike an appropriate balance between the
rights of the copyright owner and the public interest.”); William M. Landes and Richard A.
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ready access to information and art rests on one side,36 on the other rests the
need to incentivize creators.37
The first sale doctrine is a thumb on the scale in favor of access in this
balancing test between public access and control for creator incentive. The
current form of the first sale doctrine provides that “the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under [the Copyright Act], or
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy or phonorecord.”38 The first sale doctrine became law in BobbsMerrill Co., a 1908 Supreme Court decision. The following year, as part of
a larger overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress codified the first sale
doctrine.39 Since that time, scholars have come to view the first sale
doctrine as important to promoting policies embraced by copyright law
more generally.40 Part I.A examines these policies and their rationales to
frame an analysis of the repeating struggle between public access and
control for creator incentive in copyright history and to understand why
public access usually wins. Part I.B reviews the history of this struggle and
the results of choosing law or legislation in favor of one side over the other.
Part I.C discusses the digital revolution, the governmental response—
particularly through the DMCA—and how the DMCA’s “wait and see”
approach has currently shifted the balance from public access toward
control for creator incentive.
A. The Policies Supporting the First Sale Doctrine
Scholars have identified at least six policies that the first sale doctrine
promotes: (1) access, (2) preservation, (3) privacy, (4) transactional clarity,
(5) innovation, and (6) platform competition.41 Access is discussed first
because it provides the basis for the remaining policies. Without providing
access, these other important policies would be difficult to achieve.

Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989)
(“Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place. Striking the correct
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”).
36. See Dworkin, supra note 35, ¶ 7.03, at 154; Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 326.
37. See Dworkin, supra note 35, ¶ 7.03, at 154; Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 326.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
39. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 109(a)).
40. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889,
894–901 (2011); see also, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and
the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1310–38 (2001); R.
Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577,
585–610 (2003); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 917–
24 (2008).
41. See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 894–901; see also Liu, supra
note 40, at 1310–38; Reese, supra note 40, at 585–610; Van Houweling, supra note 40, at
917–24.
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1. Access
The first sale doctrine improves access to property in two ways:
affordability and availability.42 The restriction on copyright owners’ rights
after the initial sale enables retail competition, secondary markets, rental
markets, and public lending, which help make copyrighted materials far
more affordable to consumers.43
The first sale doctrine generates retail competition because once a
copyright holder sells copies of his work to a retailer, the retailer can legally
resell the copies to the public at any price it chooses.44 As a result, the
public benefits from competition between retailers.45 The Court addressed
this exact situation in Bobbs-Merrill Co.46
In addition, the first sale doctrine allows privately owned copies to be
resold on the secondary market.47 The secondary market increases
affordability because these copies are often used and usually sell at a lower
price compared to new copies.48 For some consumers, this opportunity to
resell also encourages purchases of new copies because subsequent resale
results in a lower net cost.49
Next, the first sale doctrine makes copyrighted material more affordable
by creating a rental market. The rental of copies provides access for
individuals who cannot afford or are unwilling to pay the price of acquiring
ownership.50 Although the rental market for copyrighted works today is
primarily limited to motion pictures as a result of rental amendments to the
current Copyright Act,51 rental markets have existed in the past when the

42. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 894.
43. See Reese, supra note 40, at 585–92.
44. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (“In our view the
copyright statutes, . . . do not create the right to impose, by notice, . . . a limitation at which
the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers . . . .”).
45. See Reese, supra note 40, at 585 (“More efficient retailers, with lower overhead
costs, may be able to sell copies at a lower mark-up than less efficient retailers or retailers
who wish to maintain a higher price-point for marketing reasons.”).
46. See infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text.
47. See John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule: Are Software
Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 79 (2004); see also Perzanowski & Schultz,
supra note 40, at 894 (discussing used bookstores and online auction sites specifically).
48. See, e.g., Ed Christman, As Used-CD Biz Grows, Chains Get in on Act, BILLBOARD,
July 10, 1999, at 1, 92 (noting that used CDs sell at prices between $5.99 and $8.99
compared to $17.98 “for a catalog CD”); Erik Gruenwedel, Blockbuster Testing New, Used
DVD Sales on Web, HOME MEDIA MAG., May 27–June 2, 2007, at 1 (noting that used DVDs
sell at prices between $4.99 and $9.99 compared to new DVDs costing between $16.99 and
$21.99).
49. See Ed Christman, Both Retailer, Label Claims Backed by Used-CD Survey,
BILLBOARD, Oct. 2, 1993, at 4, 112 (discussing a National Association of Recording
Merchandisers study that showed 24.6 percent of respondents said the potential for resale
factored into their purchase, but 41.4 percent said it did not).
50. See Reese, supra note 40, at 587–88.
51. See infra notes 231–42, 287–92 and accompanying text.
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means of copying were more difficult than in the recorded music and
computer software fields.52
Finally, the first sale doctrine reduces the cost of copyrighted works by
making copies available through public lending libraries.53 Public lending
is the epitome of affordability because the public gains access to the copy
often without a direct charge.54 However, the individual does incur
nonmonetary costs. These nonmonetary costs include: waiting for the
library to obtain a copy, waiting her turn to borrow the copy if the library
lends the copy to someone else first, returning the copy after a specified
period of time at the risk of incurring fines, and possessing the copy subject
to the library’s recall.55 These nonmonetary costs thus sacrifice availability
for affordability.56
In addition to affordability, the first sale doctrine ensures the availability
of copyrighted works.57 Copyrighted works may become unavailable for
several reasons. For example, copyright owners may allow the work to go
out of print because it is not economically viable to continue to produce
copies.58 Of the 187,280 books published in the United States between
1927 and 1946, only 4,267 remain in print today.59 This means that over 97
percent of the copyrighted works published during that time lie
commercially dormant and inaccessible.60 Similarly, of the 157,068 titles
listed in the Turner Classic Movies’ database, fewer than 4 percent are
available on home video.61 Simply because the demand for a work is

52. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 95 (1999)
(observing that, in response to demand, booksellers began renting books and that these
circulating libraries survived from sometime before 1814 and well into the 1950s); see also
CHARLES KNIGHT, THE OLD PRINTER AND THE MODERN PRESS 229–36 (1854) (discussing the
effect of the circulating library on public literacy and the availability of books).
53. See Robert M. Glushko, The Future of Copyright, INFO. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1, 2010, at
14, 15 (“[T]he first sale doctrine is the current cornerstone of library lending.”).
54. See Reese, supra note 40, at 588. Of course, many library users pay for the library
through a tuition charge or taxes. See id. at 589. Still others may pay a membership fee or
borrowing charge. See id.
55. See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 101 n.13 (2000); see also Reese, supra note 40, at 588
n.42.
56. See Reese, supra note 40, at 589.
57. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 895; Reese, supra note 43, at 592.
58. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 112–13 (2004) (describing creative property
as experiencing “different lives” and observing that books go out of print very quickly).
59. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the National Memory:
How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital Archives, 4 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 472 (2002).
60. See id.
61. See Anthony Kaufman, The Vanishing: The Demise of VHS, and the Movies
Disappearing Along With It, MUSEUM MOVING IMAGE (Feb. 26, 2009), http://
www.movingimagesource.us/articles/the-vanishing-20090226.
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insufficient to make it economically viable to produce copies does not mean
that the demand is nonexistent, or even negligible.62
Moreover, copyright owners may wish to suppress their work because
their views on it have changed.63 For example, on his deathbed, Virgil
asked that The Aeneid be burned.64 More recently, film director Tony Kaye
attempted to thwart the success of his film American History X.65
Additionally, successors in copyright may have different views from the
original copyright owner and may wish to remove the work from public
access.66
Also, copyright owners sometimes purposely withdraw their work from
the marketplace temporarily in order to generate demand.67 One wellknown example of a company who employs this marketing strategy is Walt
Disney, Co.68 The company routinely limits the availability of its animated
films for viewing in theatres and purchase on videocassette and DVD by
withdrawing them from the market for a number of years.69 This builds
demand for the movie by making its availability artificially scarce.70
In each of these cases, the first sale doctrine provides an individual who
wants to access a work that the copyright holder wishes to suppress with the
opportunity to purchase a used copy on the secondary market, rent a copy
on the rental market, or borrow a copy through public lending.71
2. Preservation
Statistically speaking, a work has a better chance of surviving over time
if more copies of that work exist.72 One reason is that different copy
owners will treat their copies differently.73 One “dramatic example of the

62. See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Publisher and Authors Parse a Term: Out of Print, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2007, at C3 (discussing Paula Fox, an author of six out-of-print novels who
revived her career after a Harper’s Magazine article cited her work).
63. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595.
64. See THE VIRGILIAN TRADITION: THE FIRST FIFTEEN HUNDRED YEARS 420–25 (Jan
Ziolkowski & Michael C.J. Putnam eds., 2008).
65. See Benjamin Svetkey, X Marks the Spat, ENT. WKLY., Oct. 23, 1998, at 28, 33–36
(discussing Kaye’s attempt to pull the film from the Toronto film festival and running
advertisements negatively portraying the film).
66. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595 (explaining that James Boswell’s son believed that
Boswell’s Life of Johnson portrayed his father in a bad light and would have suppressed the
work if he succeeded in copyright ownership).
67. See id. at 602.
68. See Eric Felten, Disney’s Movie Vault: Scarily Creating a Fantasia of Scarcity,
WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870490460457
6333344180431886.html (describing Disney’s “longstanding practice” of taking its films off
the market).
69. See id.
70. See id. (suggesting that Disney’s “dreaded vault isn’t so much about creating
excitement as it is about creating fear”).
71. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595.
72. See id. at 605.
73. See id. at 606.
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preservation impact of diversely situated copy holders” can be seen in old
movie reels.74
In the 1920s, movie reels were often shown in a distribution chain from
one town to the next.75 This distribution chain ended in Dawson City, in
Canada’s Yukon Territory.76 Motion picture copyright owners often
retained the rights to the reels and asked for their return at the end of the
distribution period.77 To save the expense of returning the reels,
distributors left the prints in the Canadian Bank of Commerce’s custody.78
By 1929, around five hundred films accumulated in Dawson City.79 These
reels were later used to fill in a swimming pool to convert it into an ice
rink.80 In 1978, a building project excavation uncovered the reels, which
had remained in surprisingly good condition due to the frigid temperatures
of the Yukon.81 Although these were not the only copies of the reels
initially distributed, those other copies were lost, destroyed, or
deteriorated.82 As a result of Dawson City’s unique conditions, however,
portions of some motion pictures that otherwise do not exist, remain
viewable today.83
The ability to alienate a copy from one’s possession under the first sale
doctrine is important to preservation because it results in wider distribution
and dissemination.84 Presumably, without the first sale doctrine, the
consumer who moves locations, runs out of storage room, or simply wants
to get rid of her copy would discard it if she could not sell or give the used
copy to another owner.85 Thus, a work that may otherwise disappear
remains accessible to the public.
3. Privacy
The first sale doctrine permits copy owners to transfer their copies
without the permission of the copyright holder.86 This independence fosters
privacy and anonymity.87 Because copyrighted works can be controversial

74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See Sam Kula, Rescued from the Permafrost: The Dawson Collection of Motion
Pictures, 8 ARCHIVARIA 141, 142 (1979).
77. See Reese, supra note 40, at 606. This, of course, takes the film reels out of the first
sale doctrine. However, the example serves as one of the successes of distribution in copies
for preservation. This is an aspect that the first sale doctrine supports in its normal
operation.
78. See Kula, supra note 76, at 142.
79. See id. at 144.
80. See id. at 142.
81. See id. at 143.
82. See Reese, supra note 40, at 607.
83. See Kula, supra note 76, at 146.
84. See Reese, supra note 40, 607.
85. See id. at 607–08.
86. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896.
87. See id.
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or stigmatized, lack of anonymity in distribution could chill the activity.88
An individual may not wish to be affiliated with the authors or subject
matter that she chooses to purchase, although that individual may have
valid reasons for purchasing the work.89 The first sale doctrine encourages
distribution and free expression by permitting anonymous transfer without
the copyright holder’s permission.90
4. Transactional Clarity
The first sale doctrine also clarifies a purchaser’s rights, resulting in
market efficiency.91 The law recognizes only a limited number of property
rights because limitless variety raises transaction and information costs.92
For example, if the Copyright Act permitted copyright owners to control
future sales in a myriad of different ways, including setting certain prices,
selling to certain types of consumers, alienating only certain portions,
selling only in or to certain geographic locations, and so on, the consumer
would be forced to sift through “a fragmented and confusing constellation
of terms and restrictions” for each transaction in a secondary market.93
Instead, the first sale doctrine permits the consumer to engage in clear, and
comparatively simple, transactions.94
5. Innovation
The first sale doctrine also promotes innovation.95 Copyright owners
must innovate in order to compete with secondary markets.96 For example,
after a work is circulated for several years, a copyright owner will release
new editions of material including remastered material, additional content,
updates, or add-on features.97
Similarly, forum providers for the secondary market innovate in order to
compete with one another.98 The possibility of resale encourages the
88. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1010–11 (1996).
89. See id. at 1014 (“I may read The Turner Diaries or The Fountainhead for purely
scholarly reasons, without any intent or desire to associate myself with the movements they
have come to represent.”).
90. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896.
91. See id.
92. See Van Houweling, supra note 40, at 897–98.
93. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896; see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (2000) (discussing a similar closed universe in interpreting
landlord-tenant law where “[l]eases are limited to four recognized types”).
94. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896.
95. See Zbigniew J. Bednarz, Unreal Property: Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. and the Rapid
Expansion of Copyright Owners’ Rights by Granting Broad Deference to Software License
Agreements, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 939, 962 (2012) (“[T]he second important public interest
protected by the first-sale doctrine [is] the promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation.”).
96. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 897.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 897–98.
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creation of new business models and technologies.99 Examples of such
innovation include Amazon, eBay, Netflix, and Redbox.100
Lastly, the first sale doctrine encourages innovation on the part of the
copy owner.101 The first sale doctrine allows users to reenvision their
copies into completely new objects. Examples include “a handbag made
from a classic novel, a clock made from old music CDs, or a flashing bike
light made from an old Nintendo NES video game controller.”102 The first
sale doctrine also mitigates restrictions on property that are contrary to
desirable goals that only become apparent at a later date.103 One example is
the software application Snappli, available for Apple’s iPhone. Snappli
compresses data received by the phone to reduce network usage that can
result in large bills for users without unlimited data plans.104 In order to
work, Snappli requires users to install the application and a configuration
profile.105 The configuration profile interrupts the transmission of wireless
data to a user’s phone so that Snappli’s servers can compress the data.106
These features “are, in theory, restricted by Apple.”107 However, these
features are desirable to both wireless network carriers and end users
because they reduce the use of bandwidth,108 a valuable commodity for
wireless networks109 and one source of extra charges for smartphone
users.110 Apple has approved at least two applications using this technique
99. See Bednarz, supra note 95, at 962 (“A robust secondary market creates
opportunities for entrepreneurs to create businesses, such as used-book stores, thrift stores,
and used-record stores, thereby expanding the economy.”).
100. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 898.
101. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users As Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine,
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 495 (2008) (discussing the first sale doctrine in the patent context
and noting that the related “right to repair a patented device protected and encouraged user
innovation”).
102. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 899 (footnotes omitted).
103. See Van Houweling, supra note 40, at 901 (“The problem of [excessive control by
one party over the freedom and flexibility of the other] is further compounded when a
servitude arises in a context of rapid and unpredictable change, making unforeseen
obsolescence especially likely.”).
104. See Rachel Metz, App Shrinks Your Data, Then Your Bill, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 18,
2012),
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429165/app-shrinks-your-data-then-yourbill/.
105. See Rachel Metz, Developers Use a Workaround To Make iPhone Apps Do More,
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429651/
developers-use-a-workaround-to-make-iphone-apps-do-more/.
106. See id.
107. Id.
108. See Metz, supra note 104.
109. See David Goldman, Sorry, America: Your Wireless Airwaves Are Full, CNN
MONEY (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/21/technology/spectrum_
crunch/index.htm (“Wireless spectrum—the invisible infrastructure over which all wireless
transmissions travel—is a finite resource. When, exactly, we’ll hit the wall is a subject of
intense debate, but almost everyone in the industry agrees that a crunch is coming.”).
110. See Julianne Pepitone, iPhone 5 WiFi Bug Leads to Giant Cellular Data Overages,
CNN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/01/technology/iphone
-5-data-overage/index.html (“Carriers are using carrots and sticks to move customers away
from unlimited data and toward metered billing plans that cap customers’ data use and
charge them for overages.”).
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and allows users to download them in its application marketplace, the App
Store.111
6. Platform Competition
The first sale doctrine reduces consumer lock-in and, thus, encourages
platform competition.112 Consumer lock-in results when the costs of
switching to a new vendor or technology platform are high enough to
discourage consumers from purchasing an otherwise preferable, competitive
product.113 Consumer lock-in impedes new market participants who
develop similar, but better, products.114 Accordingly, consumer lock-in
creates competitive concerns and detracts from incremental innovation.115
However, because an individual who wants to switch from Microsoft’s
Xbox video game system to Sony’s PlayStation system can recover a
substantial amount of his investment by selling the Xbox in the secondary
market, the first sale doctrine lowers the consumer lock-in barrier to
switching.116
With these policies in mind, this Note next examines the impetus behind
the creation of copyright law starting first with the introduction of the
printing press in England in 1476. Because the digital revolution that began
four hundred years later follows a very similar path, examining the initial
fluctuation between open public access and copyright protection is valuable
to crafting the proper response for digital property.
B. The Origin of Copyright Law in the Physical Domain
In 1476, William Caxton introduced the printing press to England.117
Along with the ability to produce a large amount of printed material,
Caxton’s introduction brought a “new trade to be encouraged,”118 the
“creation of a new form of property,”119 and the potential for piracy.120

111. See Metz, supra note 105.
112. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 900.
113. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 52, at 11 (describing the ability of CDs to
overcome lock-in, while “[q]uadrophonic sound, stereo AM radio, PicturePhones, and digital
audiotape did not fare as well”).
114. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 900.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1968).
118. Id. at 21.
119. Id. at 20.
120. It appears that Caxton was not a victim of piracy himself, see id. at 21, but at least
one scholar asserts that “had there been any competitor possessed of sufficient capital to be a
really formidable pirate,” then there may have been “a very early recognition of an author’s
rights to the fruits of his brain.” ALFRED W. POLLARD, SHAKESPEARE’S FIGHT WITH THE
PIRATES AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSMISSION OF HIS TEXT 1 (1917).

2013]

CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT

1979

1. The Evolution of Copyright in England: Finding the Balance Between
Public Access and Control
At first, the British government failed to regulate the new trade.121 As
the trade grew, native printers repeatedly sought to eliminate foreign
competition,122 sometimes by violence.123 In response, the British
government passed statutes that included printing and bookselling in their
protection of domestic trade.124 Throughout this time, the printers
continued to seek greater control over their trade.125
In 1557, Queen Mary chartered the Royal Stationers’ Company of
London.126 This charter granted the printers a monopoly on publishing,127
permitting the Stationers’ Company to control the book trade and,
subsequently, to seek even further expansion of that control.128
However, the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly did not last forever. In
1694, the House of Commons allowed the copyright statute, then known as
the Licensing Act, to lapse.129 Among the House of Commons’ reasons for
opposing renewal of the Licensing Act was that the Act gave the Stationers’
Company the right to impede the printing of all books, including those
considered “innocent and useful.”130
Once the Licensing Act expired, however, “piracy sprouted.”131 In
Scotland, “no centrali[z]ed limitation was placed on the proliferation of
121. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 21–22 (discussing the exception of printing and
bookselling from a 1484 statute regulating foreign trade); H.G. Aldis, The Book-Trade,
1557–1625, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 432, 458 (A.W. Ward & A.R.
Waller eds., 1910) (“In the early days of printing in England, when the native press produced
but a very small proportion of the books in demand, the foreign printer and stationer were so
freely tolerated, if not actively encouraged, that a large part of the trade fell into the hands of
strangers.”).
122. See Aldis, supra note 121, at 458.
123. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 22 (discussing both the case of Pynson v. Squyer
involving “murderous attacks” by printers against a “Norman-born printer,” and “the ‘Evil
May Day’ of 1517, when a mob of two thousand attacked the French and Flemish quarters
and sacked the houses.”).
124. See id. at 22–23 (citing 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1523) (Eng.), 21 Hen. 8, c. 16 (1529)
(Eng.), and 25 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1533) (Eng.)).
125. See id. at 29 (noting that “[a]s early as 1542, the [printers] had requested a charter”
of incorporation).
126. See JOHN GANTZ & JACK B. ROCHESTER, PIRATES OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM: HOW
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS DAMAGE OUR PERSONAL FREEDOMS, OUR JOBS, AND THE
WORLD ECONOMY 34 (2005); PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 28.
127. See GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34; see also PATTERSON, supra note
117, at 31 (discussing the Stationers’ Company’s “high degree of autonomy in controlling
the book trade”).
128. See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY: A HISTORY, 1403–1959, at 40
(1960); see also PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 38 (noting that this incorporation “marked
the first round in the continuing struggle of the stationers to enhance their monopoly”).
129. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 139.
130. See id. (quoting 11 H.C. JOUR. (1695) 305–06 (Eng.)).
131. GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34; see also R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS
LAW AND ITS LITERATURE 5 (1886) (“With the expiration of [licensing] acts in 1679
legislative penalties lapsed, and piracy became common. . . . [After a second lapse in 1694,
p]iracy again flourished.”); DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 53 (1992) (citing
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presses” and, by comparison to England, copyright was limited.132 As a
result, Scottish publishers could copy English books and resell them in
England at a much lower cost.133
The Stationers’ Company repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to
regain control through censorship laws—the government’s original purpose
in granting the monopoly.134 In 1707, however, the publishers refocused
attention from censorship laws to their property interest and the incentive to
continue printing.135
On December 12, 1709, the bill that became the first copyright statute
started with a petition similar to the 1707 bill.136 In 1710, the British
government enacted the Statute of Anne.137 At the time of its passage, the
sought-after statute represented a victory for the Stationers’ Company.138
As time went on, however, Professor Feather asserts that the 1710 Act
proved to be “thoroughly unsatisfactory.”139
The most notable characteristic of the Statute of Anne is that it placed
limits on the term of the copyright.140 Shortly after the passage of the
Statute of Anne, the Stationers’ Company’s behavior demonstrates no
discernable difference in the law.141 But, by 1731, the copyrights that
existed before 1710 approached expiration.142 In response, the Stationers’
Company sought expansion of the copyright term in Parliament into
perpetuity.143

a petition before Parliament in 1710 “arguing that in [the Licensing Act’s] absence those
booksellers who legally buy their copies are ruined by the pirates who do not”); Daniel
DeFoe, An Essay on the Regulation of the Press (1704), available at http://
www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/defoe2.html (discussing “a certain sort of
Thieving which is now in full practice in England, and which no Law extends to punish, viz.
some Printers and Booksellers printing Copies none of their own”).
132. Alastair J. Mann, “A Mongrel of Early Modern Copyright”: Scotland in European
Perspective, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 51, 55, 57
(Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010).
133. GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34.
134. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 140–41.
135. See 15 H.C. JOUR. (1707) 313 (Eng.). Facially, confusion exists as to the date of the
bill’s introduction. Compare JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY, AND POLITICS: AN
HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 56 (1994) (placing the bill in February 1707),
with PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 142 (identifying the date as February 26, 1706 (O.S.)).
This discrepancy arises from British use of the Julian calendar through 1752. See The 1752
Calendar Change, CONN. ST. LIBR. (Sept. 2008), http://www.cslib.org/CalendarChange.htm.
Where applicable, this Note attempts to modernize the dates in adherence with the Gregorian
calendar.
136. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 142.
137. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books
in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.); see GANTZ &
ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 35.
138. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 62.
139. See id. at 64.
140. See GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 35.
141. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 67–68; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 152.
142. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 68.
143. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 154–58.
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When this failed, the Stationers’ Company turned to the courts.144 The
Stationers’ Company’s attempt to protect the copyrights expiring under the
Statute of Anne did not seek an extension of limits, but rather aimed to
establish a perpetual copyright.145 In order to do so, their “principal
weapon” was the idea of the common law copyright.146 This idea asserted
that copyright is, in its essence, the author’s natural right.147
In 1769, the King’s Bench ruled, in Millar v. Taylor,148 that a common
law copyright did exist.149 However, Millar did not last long as
precedent.150 After the decision in Millar, a Scottish bookseller named
Alexander Donaldson purposely reprinted the same work in dispute in
Millar.151 In response, the copyright holders brought an action for an
injunction.152 The House of Lords, in Donaldson v. Beckett,153 held that the
Statute of Anne destroyed and replaced the author’s common law right to
the sole printing, publishing, and vending of his works.154 As a result, the
Donaldson case ended the printers’ claim to perpetual monopoly.155 The
Donaldson case’s view of copyright as limited in term was the view
received into the fledgling United States of America just a few years
later.156

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 158.
See id. at 153.
See id.
See id.
(1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.).
Id. at 256–57; see ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 30 (2010).
150. See ALEXANDER, supra note 149, at 30; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 172 (“Millar
v. Taylor . . . lasted as a precedent for only five years.”).
151. See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES 123 (2009) (referring to Donaldson’s choice as a “calculated decision”); see also
Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838.
152. See JOHNS, supra note 151, at 124.
153. (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838.
154. See 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1774) 953, 1003; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 174
(“The actual holding of the Donaldson case is that the author’s common-law right to the sole
printing, publishing, and vending of his works, a right which he could assign in perpetuity, is
taken away and supplanted by the Statute of Anne.”).
155. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 178 (noting that “the Donaldson case was widely
approved at the time of its rendering, except by the few monopolists whom it affected
directly” and discussing these monopolists’ plea to Parliament for relief, just six days after
the decision in Donaldson, “contending that in reliance on the Millar case they had invested
thousands of pounds in the purchase of old copyrights not protected by statute”); see also 17
PARL. HIST. ENG. (1774) 1078.
156. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 179; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”).
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2. The American Version: Balancing Public Access and
Control from the Outset
The American response to the printing press, like much of American
jurisprudence, mirrors that of England in many respects. In 1638, the first
printing press arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts.157 Like England,
authorities in Massachusetts treated the press as requiring supervision and
suppression.158 However, these authorities also viewed the press as a
public utility, and this view balanced the need to regulate.159 As a result,
“[t]hroughout the colonial period . . . the press was seen as an important but
dangerous public resource to be encouraged and used by the government,
but also to be restricted and regulated.”160
On September 5, 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, a
committee submitted a proposal reflecting this concern of balancing access
and control: “To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by
securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries.”161 The delegates adopted this
clause without debate.162
On May 31, 1790, the First Congress passed the first federal copyright
act.163 The title of this act again highlights the balance between access and
control164: “An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the
copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned.”165
In 1834, Wheaton v. Peters,166the first landmark copyright case in the
United States came before the Supreme Court.167 Henry Wheaton authored
twelve United States Supreme Court reporters, known as Wheaton’s
Reports between 1816 and 1827.168 In June 1828, Wheaton’s successor,
157. See Oren Bracha, Early American Printing Privileges. The Ambivalent Origins of
Authors’ Copyright in America, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY, supra note 132, at 89, 91.
158. See id. at 92.
159. See id. (“The Massachusetts authorities perceived the importance of the press to both
the authority of civil government and the religious and intellectual mission of the colony’s
elite. . . . Alongside its public utility, the press could also be a dangerous catalyst of civil
and religious dissent and unrest.”).
160. See id. at 95–96.
161. JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN
THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 510–11 (1845).
162. See id. at 512.
163. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 197; see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat.
124.
164. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
165. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 197.
166. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
167. BENJAMIN W. RUDD, NOTABLE DATES IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT, 1783–1969, at 138,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf. There are only two decisions in
American jurisprudence pertaining to copyright during the period from 1790 to 1834:
Nichols v. Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Conn. 1808), and Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1824) (No. 4584), each dealing with the technical requirements of the 1790 Act. See
PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 207 n.15.
168. See id. at 593.
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Richard Peters, circulated a letter proposing to replace the twenty-five
volumes previously published by Alexander Dallas, William Cranch, and
Wheaton with six volumes at one-fifth of their cost.169 In May 1831, after
Peters published his third volume (and the first to contain Wheaton’s
Reports), Wheaton filed a bill in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania seeking an injunction and accounting against Peters.170
In 1834, the case came before the Supreme Court upon the circuit court’s
dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the bill.171 Wheaton claimed
a copyright under both the common law and the Copyright Act.172 Justice
John McLean, writing for the Court, adopted the position that no common
law copyright existed in the United States.173 First, the Court observed that
there was no federal common law.174 Accordingly, any asserted common
law right must arise from the state in which the controversy originated.175
For this reason, the Court examined whether the state of Pennsylvania,
where Wheaton’s Reports was first published, had adopted English
common law copyright (assuming one existed).176 Despite modern
evidence to the contrary,177 the Court took the view that English judicial
history of author’s literary property began in 1760.178 With this date in
mind, the Court found no common law copyright existed “when the colony
of Penn was organized”179 and that the controversy over the existence of a
common law copyright did not arise until “[l]ong afterwards.”180
The majority found a close parsing of the language used in Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution, and the Copyright Act of 1790 even more
conclusive.181 The Court rejected the argument that “secure” as used in the
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution meant “to preserve,” because the
founders referred to “securing” a right to both authors and inventors.182
Based on this phrasing, “secure” must mean a future right because no one

169. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 203–04.
170. See Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 17,486).
171. See id. at 872; see also Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 591, 592.
172. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 596–617.
173. See id. at 661. Only six justices sat in decision over the Wheaton case: Chief Justice
John Marshall, and Associate Justices Henry Baldwin, Gabriel Duval, John McLean, Joseph
Story, and Smith Thompson. See FREDERICK C. HICKS, MEN AND BOOKS FAMOUS IN THE LAW
209 (1921).
174. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 657 (“It is clear, there can be no common law of the United
States. The federal government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent
states; each of which may have its local usages, customs and common law.”).
175. See id.
176. See id. at 658–59.
177. See supra notes 117–47 and accompanying text.
178. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658.
179. Id. at 660. King Charles II granted Pennsylvania to William Penn as payment for a
debt of £16,000 owed to his father Admiral Sir William Penn on March 4, 1681. See The
Quaker Province: 1681–1776, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/wu01/vc/
visitor_info/pa_history/II.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
180. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 660.
181. See id. at 661.
182. See id.
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ever “pretended . . . in this country or in England, that an inventor has a
perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”183
Similarly, the Court found that Congress was referring to a future right in
the Copyright Act of 1790 by its use of the language “shall have the sole
right and liberty of printing.”184 From this reasoning, the Court concluded
that in order to secure his right, Wheaton must have strictly complied with
all of the requirements of the Copyright Act in order to obtain the
copyright.185 Because the record failed to disclose whether Wheaton
complied with these requirements, the order to dissolve the injunction was
vacated and the case was remanded.186
By holding as it did, the Court incorporated the philosophy espoused in
Donaldson into American law: an author’s copyright is a statutory grant of
monopoly limited in duration “in derogation of the rights of the public.”187
A limited copyright, however, is important to provide an incentive to create
and must not always yield to public access.188
Nearly twenty years after Wheaton, the Court faced a new question: Are
copyright and property rights separate? In Stephens v. Cady189 and Stevens
v. Gladding,190 the Court answered this question in the affirmative.191 Both
Cady and Gladding involved the same petitioner and arose from the same
set of facts. The petitioner, James Stevens, registered the copyright to a
map of Rhode Island that he engraved onto a copperplate on April 23,
1831.192 The defendant in Cady, Isaac Cady, purchased this copperplate for
$245 under a sale on an execution from a judgment against Stevens.193 The
defendants in Gladding, Royal Gladding and Isaac T. Proud, sold maps that
Cady printed from the copperplate.194 Stevens asserted that, by doing so,
the defendants violated his copyright, which was separate from the property
right in the copperplate.195
In Cady, the defendant did not follow the appeal into the Court.196 As a
result, the Court did not receive any arguments for sustaining the lower
court’s dismissal of Stevens’s complaint.197 In Gladding, the defendants
argued that whenever a copyright owner creates a plate that is incapable of
183. Id.
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
185. See id. at 667.
186. See id. at 667–68.
187. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law:
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119, 1185 (1983).
188. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (describing the rise of piracy in the
absence of copyright protection and the negative effect of piracy on creator incentive).
189. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852).
190. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854).
191. See id. at 453; Cady, 55 U.S. at 532.
192. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450; Cady, 55 U.S. at 529.
193. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450; Cady, 55 U.S. at 529.
194. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450.
195. See id.
196. See Cady, 55 U.S. at 530.
197. See id.
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beneficial use beyond printing his map, “he thereby annexes to the plate the
right to use it for printing that map, and also the right to publish and sell the
copies when printed.”198
In Cady, Justice Samuel Nelson delivered the opinion of the Court.199
The Court cited to Millar, observing that copyright includes “an incorporeal
right to print and publish the map.”200 In essence, the Court reasoned that
to find that the copyright inhered in the property right “would be saying . . .
that the exclusive right to make any given work of art necessarily belonged
to the person who happened to become the owner of the tools with which it
was made.”201 As a result, the Court reversed the decree below.202
In Gladding, Justice Benjamin R. Curtis delivered the opinion of the
Court, adding to the decision in Cady.203 The Court found that selling a
copperplate transfers the right to lawfully use it “but not the right to a use
thereof, by reason of the ownership of something else which he has not
bought, and which belongs to a third person.”204 Because the copyright
existed distinctly and independently from the property right, by grant from
the federal government, it is not annexed to the property “either by the act
of its owner or by operation of law.”205 Therefore, the Court reversed the
decree of the court below.206
With copyright and property rights firmly defined as separate, copyright
owners sought to gain greater control over the copies they produced. Just
over fifty years after Cady and Gladding, the Court considered whether a
copyright permits the holder to restrict resale of the copies she produced.
In Bobbs-Merrill Co., Bobbs-Merrill Co. owned the copyright for a book
entitled The Castaway.207 In copies of the book, Bobbs-Merrill printed the
following notice, immediately below the copyright notice: “‘The price of
this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less
price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the
copyright.’”208
The defendants, Isidor and Nathan Straus, partners at R. H. Macy & Co.,
purchased copies of the book for retail sale.209 Macy’s purchased 90
percent of the copies at a wholesale price, about 40 percent below retail.210
Macy’s purchased the remaining 10 percent at full retail price.211 Both the
198. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450.
199. See Cady, 55 U.S. at 529.
200. Cady, 55 U.S. at 530; see Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 251 (The
copy is “a property in notion, and has no corporeal tangible substance.”).
201. Cady, 55 U.S. at 530.
202. See id. at 532.
203. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450.
204. Id. at 453.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 455.
207. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908).
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 341–42.
211. See id. at 342.
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defendants and the wholesale dealers knew that The Castaway was
copyrighted.212 Nevertheless, Bobbs-Merrill and the wholesale dealers had
no agreement to restrict the wholesalers’ sales to retailers who would
observe the terms of the notice.213 As a result, Macy’s sold copies of the
book for eighty-nine cents each without Bobbs-Merrill’s consent.214
Bobbs-Merrill asserted that because the Copyright Act vested it with the
sole right to “vend,” the Copyright Act permitted Bobbs-Merrill to restrict
future sales.215 Justice William R. Day wrote the opinion for the Court.216
The Court turned first to precedent, citing Wheaton to confirm that the
published works’ copyright originated solely from statute.217 Next, the
Court cited Cady to establish that “the main purpose” of the Copyright Act
of 1790 and its successive amending statutes was to “secure the author the
right to multiply copies of his work.”218
With this historical backdrop in mind, the Court turned to a close parsing
of the language of the statute, focusing on three sections: §§ 4952, 4965,
and 4970.219 The Court determined that the right to vend was of primary
importance to achieving the statute’s main purpose of securing the sole
right to multiply copies of the work to the copyright holder.220 However,
the copyright owner exhausted her right to vend upon completion of the
first sale.221 Any reading of the statute that extended the right to vend to a
right to control future sales “extend[ed the statute’s] operation, by
construction, beyond its meaning.”222 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the
lower court’s decree dismissing Bobbs-Merrill’s complaint.223
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Congress embraced the holding in its 1909 revision of the Copyright Act,
which provided that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent,
or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained.”224 In fact, through the first seventy-five
years after its codification, neither Congress nor the courts sought to alter
the first sale doctrine in any meaningful way.225

212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 343.
216. See id. at 341.
217. See id. at 346.
218. Id. at 347 (citing Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528, 530 (1852)).
219. See id. at 348.
220. See id. at 350–51.
221. See id. at 351.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006)).
225. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 909 n.96 (noting that “[t]he next major
revision”—the Copyright Act of 1976—simply clarified that first sale doctrine protection
extended only to those copies created under the copyright holder’s authority).
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3. New Media, New Battles Between Access and Control, and the
Legislative-Judicial Divide: Betamax and the Record Rental Amendment
During the first seventy-five years after the codification of the first sale
doctrine, media consumption remained relatively static.
Television
broadcasted programs and theaters showed movies,226 radio played music
and people listened to audio recordings on vinyl records,227 and people read
paperback and hardcover books.228
In fact, despite the introduction of the audiocassette in the 1960s, home
taping did not become popular until the late 1970s. At that time, cassette
quality increased, Sony released its portable cassette player (the Walkman),
and automobile sound systems converted from 8-track tape (a playbackonly medium) to audiocassette.229 Also around this time, the videocassette
recorder, like Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s VHS, became affordable for the
average customer.230
As access to these media and technology grew, so did the potential for
piracy and concern over copyright holders’ inadequate control. In June
1980, the first commercial record rental operation opened in Japan.231 In
September 1981, the first U.S. rental record shop, Rent-A-Record, opened
in Providence, Rhode Island.232 These shops spread quickly with more than
250 opening in the United States by April 1983.233 Often, the rental record
shops provided blank audiocassette tapes at deep discounts or even free
with record rentals.234 In Japan, the Japan Phonograph Record Association
blamed the proliferation of record rental shops for the first drop in record
sales in twenty-five years.235

226. See, e.g., Golden Age, 1930’s through 1950’s, FCC (Nov. 21, 2005), http://transition
.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1930-1959.html; Wired, Zapped, and Beamed, 1960’s Through
1980’s, FCC (Nov. 21, 2005), http://transition.fcc.gov/omd/history/tv/1960-1989.html.
227. See, e.g., David H. Horowitz, The Record Rental Amendment of 1984: A Case Study
in the Effort To Adapt Copyright Law to New Technology, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 31,
42–43 (1987); The Ideas that Made Radio Possible, FCC (Nov. 21, 2005),
http://transition.fcc.gov/omd/history/radio/ideas.html.
228. See, e.g., Anne Trubek, How the Paperback Novel Changed Popular Literature,
SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/How-thePaperback-Novel-Changed-Popular-Literature.html.
229. See Horowitz, supra note 227, at 42–43.
230. See 50 Years of the Video Cassette Recorder, WIPO MAG. (World Intellectual Prop.
Org., Geneva, Switz.), Nov. 2006, at 8, 8–9, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipo_
magazine/en/pdf/2006/wipo_pub_121_2006_06.pdf.
231. See Audio and Video Rental: Hearing on S. 32 and S. 33 Before the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 238
(1983) [hereinafter Rental Hearing] (joint statement of AGAC/The Songwriters Guild, The
National Association of Recording Merchandisers, The National Music Publishers’
Association, and the Record Industry Association of America). By February 1983, more
than 1600 rental shops opened in Japan. See id.
232. Irv Lichtman, Rent-A-Record Bows Unit in U.S., BILLBOARD, Sept. 19, 1981, at 3, 3.
233. See Rental Hearing, supra note 231, at 238.
234. See id. at 239–43.
235. See Shig Fujita, Japanese Disk Production Off: Rental Blamed, BILLBOARD, Feb.
27, 1982, at 1, 1.
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Also in 1983, the music industry braced for what was then heralded as
“the biggest phenomenon . . . since stereo was introduced”: the compact
disc.236 At the time, music industry commentators viewed the compact disc
to be “virtually indestructible. Scratch them, walk on them, play them as
many times as you like and they lose none of their quality.”237
In response to these burgeoning developments, the Copyright Act of
1976 seemingly offered no protection for the copyright holder. Section 106
granted the copyright holder the exclusive right of reproduction and
distribution.238 However, the first sale doctrine limited § 106: “‘the owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.’”239 Under this
statutory provision, the copyright holder could prevent a record rental store
from actively making copies, but it could not prevent a record rental store
from simply renting records while consumers made copies privately.240
As a result, Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment of 1984.241
This amendment added a new subsection to the codification of the first sale
doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b), excepting commercial “rental, lease, or
lending” from the rights of a phonorecord owner under the first sale
doctrine.242
In 1992, Congress passed similar legislation entitled the Audio Home
Recording Act243 (AHRA) in response to another new technology: digital
audiotape (DAT). This legislation broadly defines a “digital audio copied
recording” to include “a reproduction in a digital recording format of a
digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from
another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.”244 In
addition, the AHRA permitted limited copying through the use of a Serial

236. Craig Unger, The Compact Discs: Hearing Is Believing, N.Y. MAG., Apr. 4, 1983,
at 55, 56.
237. Id.
238. See Horowitz, supra note 227, at 34 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3) (1982)).
239. See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982)).
240. See id. at 34–35; see also, e.g., Elektra Records v. Gem Elec. Distribs., 360 F. Supp.
821, 823 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that a store owner’s practice of lending an album to a
patron to make a copy on recording equipment in the store constituted “commercial
exploitation by [the store owners] for profit in derogation of [the copyright holders’] rights
of exclusive publication.”).
241. Pub. L. No. 98-450, 98 Stat. 1727 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)
(2006)).
242. See § 2(2), 98 Stat. at 1727 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a),
unless authorized by the owners of copyright in the sound recording and in the musical
works embodied therein, the owner of a particular phonorecord may not, for purposes of
direct or indirect commercial advantage, dispose of, or authorize the disposal of, the
possession of that phonorecord by rental, lease, or lending, or by any other act or practice in
the nature of rental, lease, or lending.”).
243. Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1010 (2006)).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (2006).
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Copying Management System.245 The Serial Copying Management System
permits copying from a legally purchased copy (i.e., first generation
copying), but not from copies made from the legally purchased copy (i.e.,
second generation copying).246 However, subsequent interpretation has
limited the scope of AHRA to DAT format.247
While Congress considered how to balance public access with copyright
holder control in audiocassettes, the judiciary tackled the same problem in
videocassettes.248 This judicial review culminated in Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax).249
In Betamax, Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions sought to
hold Sony liable for copyright infringement because “some individuals had
used Betamax video tape recorders . . . to record some of [Universal and
Walt Disney]’s copyrighted works which had been exhibited on
commercially sponsored television.”250 Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the
opinion of the Court, from which four justices dissented.251
The Betamax Court found that the evidence supported the idea that the
majority of VCR users utilized the recording technology for time-shifting
purposes (i.e., users would record a program in order to view it once at a
different time).252 When considering whether this use infringed on
Universal and Walt Disney’s copyrights, the Court stated it “must be
circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative
enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”253 In so
doing, it focused on “[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the [limited copyright] monopoly,” which it identified

245. See id. §§ 1001(11), 1002(a); see also June M. Besek, Anti-circumvention Laws and
Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 385, 437 (2004).
246. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(11), 1002(a); see also Besek, supra note 245, at 437.
247. See Kenneth Long, The RIAA’s Case Against Ripping CDs: When Enough Is
Enough, 11 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 173, 188 (2011); see also Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am.
v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that
the AHRA does not govern computers or MP3 players); Kimberly D. Simon, Establishing
Accountability on the Digital Frontier: Liability for Third Party Copyright Infringement
Extends to Manufacturers of Audio Compression Software, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 921, 931–
36 (2002) (summarizing cases finding that the AHRA is limited to DAT technology). For a
concise explanation of DAT technology, see Taro J. Kawamura, Digital Audio Tape
Technology: A Formidable Challenge to the American Copyright System, 4 AM. U.J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 409, 409 n.1 (1989).
248. See Horowitz, supra note 227, at 38–39 (“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
copyright issues presented by the new home videocassette recorder (“VCR”) were being
tested, not in Congress, but in the courts.”).
249. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
250. See id. at 420.
251. Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices
Thurgood Marshall, Lewis F. Powell, and William H. Rehnquist. See id. at 457 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 423 (majority opinion).
253. Id. at 431.
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as “the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”254
With these principles in mind, the Court determined that private, timeshifting use of VCR technology constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.255
Although Betamax does not expressly implicate the first sale doctrine, its
contemporaneity undoubtedly influenced the scope of the rental right.256
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Betamax likely excluded
motion pictures from the Record Rental Amendment.257 However, it is
important to note that the underlying technology involved in Betamax and
the Rental Amendment are different in two significant respects: (1) the
quality of the resultant copy; and (2) the costs associated with making that
copy.258 Music and software copying allow for pristine, near perfect
replication at relatively small cost.259 By contrast, televised motion pictures
include commercial interruptions.260 Even with the ability to pause a
recording during commercial breaks, or fast-forward past commercials,
some motion picture content may be edited for televised broadcast.261
Because the copyright holder’s “private motivation must ultimately serve
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the
254. See id. at 432 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
255. See id. at 454–55.
256. See Horowitz, supra note 227, at 43 (“Almost immediately [after the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Betamax], a flurry of bills were introduced in Congress to overrule the court’s
decision by exempting home video recording from copyright infringement.”).
257. See id. at 43–46 (discussing two bills introduced in December 1981 proposing both
compulsory licensing for home videotaping and amendments to the first sale doctrine that
would give the copyright holder control over commercial videotape and audio recording
rentals, but noting that when “the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Betamax case . . .
the momentum behind [these] bills died. It was clear that Congress was not going to deal
with home videotaping if the Supreme Court might ultimately make it unnecessary for it to
confront the issue at all.”).
258. See Betamax, 464 U.S. at 423 n.3 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 436–37 (1979)) (“As evidence of how a [VCR] may be used,
respondents offered the testimony of William Griffiths. . . . ‘He owns approximately 100
tapes. When Griffiths bought his Betamax, he intended not only to time-shift . . . but also to
build a library of cassettes. Maintaining a library, however, proved too expensive, and he is
now erasing some earlier tapes and reusing them.’”); Horowitz, supra note 227, at 41 n.48
(“In contrast to home audio cassette equipment, which enables the user to make tapes from
LPs and cassettes (as well as off-the-air), VCRs in use [in 1987] in the United States d[id]
not enable the user to make tapes from prerecorded cassettes. . . . ‘Dual cavity’ VCRs were
introduced . . . by two Japanese manufacturers, but were later withdrawn from the market.
This might have been to avoid a suit for contributory infringement under the test set forth in
the Supreme Court decision in Betamax . . . .” (citation omitted)).
259. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE COMPUTER SOFTWARE RENTAL AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 1990: THE NONPROFIT LIBRARY LENDING EXEMPTION TO THE “RENTAL RIGHT” 4 (1994)
(“Perfect copies of software could be easily and cheaply duplicated.”); David Ladd, Home
Recording and Reproduction of Protected Works, 68 A.B.A. J. 42, 42 (1982) (“[T]he same
[home audio and video] reproduction devices once used only by the copyright owner are
now widely owned.”).
260. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that
ABC edited certain Monty Python programs in part “to make time for commercials”).
261. See id.
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other arts,”262 the resulting effects on how these works are made available
to the public may influence whether one believes a content-based solution
(Betamax), a legislative solution (the Record Rental Amendment), or some
combination most effectively achieves these goals.
C. The Evolution of Copyright Law into the Digital Domain
In 2001, the U.S. Copyright Office concisely identified the difference
between physical and digital copies: “Physical copies of works degrade
with time and use, making used copies less desirable than new ones.
Digital information does not degrade, and can be reproduced perfectly on a
recipient’s computer.”263 Despite this distinction, the development of
digital property followed a very similar path to that of physical property
from Caxton’s introduction of the printing press through Bobbs-Merrill
Co.264 But, in 1998, when Congress faced the first sale question in regard
to digital property, it decided to wait to address the issue.265
1. The Distinctly Physical Origin of Digital Property
While working on the 1880 U.S. Census, twenty-year old engineer
Herman Hollerith became interested in automating the process of tabulating
data.266 By 1889, Hollerith invented technology consisting of punch cards
and readers to tally results. With this technology, Hollerith won a contract
to tabulate the 1890 Census.267
Instead of selling the equipment to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hollerith
chose to lease it.268 The technology proved successful, finishing in two and
a half years a tally that previously took seven years to complete.269
Hollerith’s technology performed other countries’ censuses and large firms’

262. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 432 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
263. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 82 (Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf; see also Arguments
Before the Comm. on Patents of the H.R. on H.R. 11943 To Amend Title 60, Chapter 3, of
the Revised Statutes of the U. S. Relating to Copyrights, 59th Cong. (1906) (statement of
Arthur W. Tams, Owner, Music Library), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909
COPYRIGHT ACT pt. F, at 10 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 1976) (discussing the
performance right but noting that the music books in question were “printed on very bad
paper, and [they] will not stand more than two years’ handling.”).
264. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
265. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 2 (characterizing a report focusing in
part on the first sale doctrine as “an outgrowth of proposals that were made
contemporaneously with the consideration of the DMCA, but were not adopted in the law”).
266. See Emerson W. Pugh, Origins of Software Bundling, 24 IEEE ANNALS OF THE HIST.
OF COMPUTING (Inst. Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs, D.C.), Jan.–Mar. 2002, at 57, 57–58; see also
JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 11 (2008).
267. See Frank da Cruz, Herman Hollerith, COLUM. UNIV. (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:38 AM),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/computinghistory/hollerith.html.
268. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 11; Pugh, supra note 266, at 58.
269. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 11.
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payroll, inventory, and billing.270 Hollerith continued to rent rather than
sell the equipment.271 Like London’s Royal Stationers’ Company of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,272 Hollerith’s choice to lease gave him
control over the ongoing computing processes of his clients.273
By the 1960s, the company, now called International Business Machines
(IBM), dominated the business computing industry.274 IBM’s computers
were general processing units, meaning that they could easily be repurposed
with new software to perform other tasks.275 However, as a result of IBM’s
licensing system, no third-party software industry existed.276 Instead, IBM
sold its hardware and software bundled together as part of a “convenient
one-stop-shopping approach to business computing.”277
In 1969, under threat of an antitrust suit from its competitors, IBM
unbundled its hardware from its software.278 After the unbundling, the
personal computer gained popularity.279 In 1977, Apple introduced the
Apple II Personal Computer.280 Unlike IBM’s customized machines, the
Apple II was a blank slate.281 Owners could program the machines
themselves or, more commonly, could load software written and then
shared or sold by programmers.282
In 1979, Software Arts released VisiCalc, the first digital spreadsheet
software.283 VisiCalc sales were significant enough that many dealers
started to bundle the Apple II with VisiCalc.284 VisiCalc’s success helped
vault Apple’s sales into the tens of thousands simply because businesses
wanted to use the digital spreadsheet.285 By 1983, IBM and another
software developer, Lotus, caught up and surpassed the Apple II and

270. See William R. Aul, Herman Hollerith: Data Processing Pioneer, THINK (Int’l Bus.
Machs., Armonk, N.Y.), Nov. 1972, at 22, 22, available at http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/
history/exhibits/builders/builders_hollerith.html.
271. See id.
272. See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
273. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 11. A notable difference is that the Stationers’
Company operated under government charter while Hollerith’s control resulted from private
choice.
274. See id. at 12.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See Steven W. Usselman, Unbundling IBM: Antitrust and the Incentives to
Innovation in American Computing, in THE CHALLENGE OF REMAINING INNOVATIVE:
INSIGHTS FROM TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN BUSINESS 249, 265–66 (Sally H. Clarke,
Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Steven W. Usselman eds., 2009).
279. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 1–2.
280. See A History of the Computer: Micro, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/
nerds/timeline/micro.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
281. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 2.
282. See id.
283. See PUB. BROAD. SERV., supra note 280.
284. See id.
285. See Tom Hormby, VisiCalc and the Rise of the Apple II, ORCHARD (Sept. 25, 2006),
http://lowendmac.com/orchard/06/visicalc-origin-bricklin.html.
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VisiCalc with their own personal computer and spreadsheet software, Lotus
1-2-3.286
2. The Physical Response to the First Digital Problem of Balancing Public
Access and Control for Creator Incentive
Personal computers opened the previously complex and technical world
of computing to the masses through their ability to easily perform a
multitude of tasks by the simple loading of software.287 But one possible
drawback of the software revolution for copyright holders was that software
could be easily copied from the disc that stored it to an arguably infinite
number of computers without quality loss.288 Much like the renting of
records,289 software copyright holders feared the implications of software
rental.290 In response, Congress enacted a similar first sale doctrine
exception just six years after the Record Rental Amendment: The
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990.291
3. Digital Property Access Problems Shed Their Physical Frame
While the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 may
have helped curtail the physical lending of discs containing software, the
amendment passed at a time when the internet was still in its infancy. As
early as 1983, a home computer owner with a telephone line and a
subscription to a network like CompuServe, The Source, America Online,
Prodigy, Genie, or MCI Mail could access an Associated Press news feed,
message on bulletin boards, play basic multiplayer games, and send private
email to subscribers of the same network.292 But much like Hollerith’s
IBM,293 these systems were proprietary.294
Just like the Apple II, the development of the internet functionally
replaced the host of proprietary network providers.295 The beginning of the
internet is traced to a message sent from UCLA to Stanford by computers
hooked up to Interface Message Processors on October 29, 1969.296

286. See id.
287. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 18.
288. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 259, at 4.
289. See supra notes 231–42 and accompanying text.
290. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 259, at 2–6.
291. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b) (2006)).
292. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 23.
293. See supra notes 266–77 and accompanying text.
294. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 23.
295. See id. at 26.
296. See Guy Raz, ‘Lo’ and Behold: A Communication Revolution, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 29, 2009, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114280698
(noting that the UCLA programmers typed “login” to begin logging in to the Stanford
computer, but the Stanford computer crashed after the second letter, making “lo” the first
internet message).
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The internet began as governmental research in computer networks.297
By the early 1990s, however, the government began to shift control of the
internet to the private sector.298 By 1997, the internet became “remarkably
decentralized and uninstitutionalized.”299 Also in the mid-1990s, Peter
Tattam developed Trumpet Winsock, a program that allowed personal
computers running Microsoft’s Windows operating system to connect to the
internet through dial-up internet service providers.300 Trumpet Winsock
proved to be extremely successful and Microsoft bundled it with late
versions of Windows 95.301 The internet soon became a network that no
particular person owned and anyone could join.302 In 1990, less than 1
percent of Americans used the internet.303 By 1999, over 35 percent of
Americans were internet users.304 The Computer Industry Almanac
estimated this percentage to equate to 110,825,000 American internet users
in 1999.305
As the number of internet users increased, so did the information and
technology these users accessed and transferred. Perhaps the most notable
technological improvement during this time was the MP3 technology306
released in 1995.307 MP3 technology is capable of encoding digital audio
files at a size practical for internet transmission and computer storage.308
Prior to the invention of MP3 technology, digital recording of a song
required forty megabytes of space.309 By comparison, an MP3 version
needed only 3.5 megabytes.310 With the internet connection technology
available at the time, this reduction in required space meant files that
previously required two hours to download could instead be downloaded in
ten minutes.311 In addition, because an MP3 is a digital file, it does not
297. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice
Shame on Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone
Network and the Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L. REV. 89, 92 (2001).
298. See id.
299. BRIAN KAHIN & JAMES KELLER, COORDINATING THE INTERNET ix (1997).
300. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 266, at 29.
301. See id.
302. See id. at 30.
303. See Internet Users (Per 100 People), UNDATA, http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=WDI
&f=Indicator_Code%3AIT.NET.USER.P2 (select “United States”; then follow “Apply
Filters” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
304. See id.
305. See U.S. Tops 100 Million Internet Users According to Computer Industry Almanac,
COMPUTER INDUS. ALMANAC INC. (Nov. 4, 1999), http://www.c-i-a.com/pr1199.htm.
306. MP3 is an abbreviation of the name Motion Picture Experts Group (MPEG) Audio
Layer III. Jacob Ganz & Joel Rose, The MP3: A History of Innovation and Betrayal, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Mar. 23, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/therecord/2011/03/23/
134622940/the-mp3-a-history-of-innovation-and-betrayal.
307. Id.
308. See Fred Goodman, MP3 Technology Poised To Redefine Music Industry, ROLLING
STONE (Mar. 9, 1999, 12:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/mp3technology-poised-to-redefine-music-industry-19990309.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See id.
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degrade over time.312 While using most compression technology will result
in original quality loss in the file, MP3 technology manipulated
psychoacoustic principles to make this quality loss generally
imperceptible.313 When a user copies a digital sound file like the MP3,
there is no quality loss because the computer simply copies the numbers
that make up the file and represent the sound sample.314
Quickly, the MP3 made it convenient and popular to transmit
“containerless files via the Internet, followed by storage on home
computers.”315 Two groups enthusiastically embraced this method:
musicians without recording contracts who benefited from the free publicity
and high school and college students who discovered they could obtain
MP3 copies of songs by most of their favorite musicians for free.316
4. The Attempt To Regain Control: A Digital Stationers’ Company?
In December 1996, delegates from more than 150 countries met to
negotiate the Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms
Treaty under the guidance of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO).317 In July 1997, President William J. Clinton submitted the
treaties for ratification by the Senate and proposed implementing legislation
to Congress.318
What began as a modest implementation effort “became a far more
comprehensive legislative project” and eventually “the most substantial
revision of the nation’s copyright law since . . . 1976.”319 In discussing
what would become the DMCA, the House Committee on Commerce
summarized its view on the new technology in no uncertain terms: “Much
like the agricultural and industrial revolutions that preceded it, the digital
revolution has unleashed a wave of economic prosperity and job growth.
Today, . . . our telecommunications industry is developing new means of
distributing information to . . . consumers in every part of the globe.”320
The DMCA addresses a number of copyright infringement concerns that
are beyond the scope of this Note.321 However, the DMCA consciously
avoided one concern: the effects of the internet on the first sale doctrine.322
312. See Lital Helman, When Your Recording Agency Turns Into an Agency Problem:
The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA 49, 84 (2009); see also Duncan
Branley, Making and Managing Audio Recordings, in RESEARCHING SOCIETY AND CULTURE
207, 214 (Clive Seale ed., 2004).
313. See Branley, supra note 312.
314. See id.
315. William Fisher, Digital Music: Problems and Possibilities, HARV. L. SCH. (Oct. 10,
2000), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/Music.html.
316. See id.
317. See H. R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21 (1998); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note
263, at 5.
318. See H. R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21.
319. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 1.
320. H. R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 21.
321. For a concise summary of the DMCA, see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY (Dec. 1998),
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As early as 1995, the effects of the internet on the distribution rights of
copyright holders and property owners were apparent.323 At this time, the
Information Infrastructure Task Force, established by President Clinton,
determined that the first sale doctrine did not protect internet users who
wished to distribute digital copies.324 The task force reasoned that, in order
to transmit a copy, computer technology required that an additional copy be
made.325 That is, when an internet user attempts to transmit his digital copy
to another user, “the transmitter retains the original copy of the work while
the recipient of the transmission obtains a reproduction of the original copy
(i.e., a new copy), rather than the copy owned by the transmitter.”326 Due
to this required reproduction, the transmission infringes the copyright
holder’s sole right to reproduction.327 As a result, the internet user would
not be protected under the first sale doctrine because he would not be
distributing his copy, but rather an unauthorized copy created by his
computer.328
This incidental copying is not exclusive to digital transmission.329 In
fact, whenever a computer program or file is loaded “from a storage
medium (hard disk, floppy disk, or [CD-ROM]) into the memory of a
central processing unit (“CPU”)” a copy is made.330 Further, “[s]treaming
necessarily involves a making of a number of copies of [the medium]—or
portions of the [medium]—along the transmission path to accomplish the
delivery of the work.”331
There is a persuasive argument that these copies are not sufficiently
“fixed”332 to meet the definition of “copy”333 under the Copyright Act.334
available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. One fertile area of debate is the
anticircumvention provision, which states, “No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under [the Copyright Act].”
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
322. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 2 (characterizing a report focusing in
part on the first sale doctrine as “an outgrowth of proposals that were made
contemporaneously with the consideration of the DMCA, but were not adopted in the law”).
323. See INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 90–95 (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf.
324. See id. at 1.
325. See id. at 92.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id.; 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (extending protection only to “the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under” the Copyright Act).
329. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS 12–13 (1978).
330. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
331. Notice of Inquiry, 66 Fed. Reg. 14,099, 14,101 (Mar. 9, 2001).
332. “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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However, this argument has not prevailed.335 In light of this technological
reality, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. §§ 117 and 512. But, by their terms,
these provisions only provide protection in very narrow circumstances.336
Section 117 requires that the copy either be made “as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that
it is used in no other manner”337 or as an archival copy “for purposes only
of maintenance or repair of [a particular] machine.”338 Section 512 applies
only to “service provider[s].”339
Considering these limitations, when Congress enacted the DMCA, it
required the Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secretary for
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce to
jointly evaluate the effects of amendments made by DMCA, “the
development of electronic commerce and associated technology,” and “the
relationship between existing and emergent technology” with the first sale
doctrine in a report no later than two years after DMCA’s enactment.340
II. PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF SOLUTION: WHAT ARE THE
RIGHT REASONS FOR THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE IN PHYSICAL PROPERTY?
SHOULD DIGITAL PROPERTY SUPPORT AN ANALOGUE? AND CAN IT?
The dispute over expanding the first sale doctrine to encompass digital
property can be viewed in two ways. First, conflict exists over the policies
that support or should be thought to support the first sale doctrine. In light
of this conflict, Part II.A.1 examines the policies behind the decision in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. Next, Part II.A.2 analyzes the policies supporting the
first sale doctrine identified by the U.S. Copyright Office in its DMCA-

333. “‘Copies’ are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device.” Id.
334. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 29, 42 (1994); Richard H. Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the
Software Users’ Rights or An Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 462–63
(1985).
335. Bob Hyde, The First Sale Doctrine and Digital Phonorecords, 1 DUKE L. & TECH.
REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[T]he prevailing view is that RAM copies are sufficiently fixed. . . .
Congress implicitly supported [this view] when it altered Section 117 to specifically overrule
the facts of MAI [Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)], while not
overruling the legal propositions of the case. In fact, Congress specifically rejected a
proposal to state that no RAM copying is infringement (and thus directly overturn MAI) in
1998.” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
336. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 117(a), 512(a).
337. See id. § 117(a).
338. See id. § 117(c).
339. See id. § 512(a).
340. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 104, 112
Stat. 2860, 2876 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (requiring an
evaluation of the DMCA amendments’ effect on existing copyright law, specifically sections
109 and 117 of the Copyright Act).
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mandated report and highlight the distinctions between these policies and
those identified by scholars.
In addition to the policy conflict, there is a dispute over whether a digital
first sale doctrine is even possible and, if so, what the best method is to
implement it. In light of this dispute, Part II.B queries whether the first sale
doctrine can be expanded to encompass digital property by exploring the
technologies considered by the U.S. Copyright Office and those
technologies developed after the report.
A. What Are the Right Reasons for the First Sale Doctrine in Physical
Property? And Should Digital Property Support an Analogue?
The access-derived policies promoted by the first sale doctrine341 are the
products of scholarship and reflection developed after more than a century
of experience living with the first sale doctrine. Regardless of the merits of
these policies, the Bobbs-Merrill Co. Court saw its task in much simpler
terms.
1. The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Reasoning: Interpreting the Statute Not To
Infringe the Right to Alienation
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. decision is simply one of statutory
interpretation.342 When the Court needed to determine whether Macy’s
could resell The Castaway below Bobbs-Merrill’s set price, it returned to
the precise language of §§ 4952, 4965, and 4970 of the Revised Statutes of
the United States.343 In construing the definition of “vend,” the Court
looked to the statute’s “main purpose,” which it identified as “secur[ing] the
right of multiplying copies of the work.”344 The Court determined this
purpose by reference to its own precedent345 and the Act’s title, “An act for
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times
therein mentioned.”346 In light of this purpose, the natural meaning of vend
could not be read to infringe upon a lawful purchaser’s right to
subsequently alienate the copy he purchased, by qualifying the title of the
purchaser.347
As a result, the first sale doctrine is founded upon the conventional and
deep-rooted understanding of physical personal property ownership.348 Just
341. See supra Part I.A.
342. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349–50 (1908) (“What does the
statute mean in granting ‘the sole right of vending the same’? . . . [T]his is purely a question
of statutory construction.”).
343. Id. at 348.
344. See id. at 350–51.
345. See id. at 346–47 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) and
Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852)).
346. See id. at 347 (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124).
347. See id. at 351.
348. See Liu, supra note 40, at 1302.
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like the purchaser of a radio or microwave can use it as often as she wishes,
loan it to a friend, or sell it to another person, so can the purchaser of a
lawfully created copy of a physical creative work.349 This view
contemplates copyright law as a statutory creature developed in a legal
environment where the physical property ownership rights previously
existed.350
2. The U.S. Copyright Office’s Report: The Physicality of the Copy
When the Copyright Office published the DMCA-mandated report, it
recommended no change to the Copyright Act.351 In part, the Copyright
Office’s recommendation arose from its view of the policies supporting the
first sale doctrine.352
Specifically, the Copyright Office expressed its view that the tangible
nature of the copy is not a “mere relic,” but rather a “defining element” of
the first sale doctrine.353 The Copyright Office viewed the physicality of
property to be the defining element because Bobbs-Merrill Co. focused on
the distinction between copyright ownership (i.e., the ownership of
intangible intellectual property) and copy ownership (i.e., the ownership of
tangible personal property).354 Keeping this distinction in mind, the
Copyright Office characterized the copyright owner’s distribution right (i.e.,
the right to “vend”) as a limit on the alienation right.355 Following through
on this concept, the Copyright Office concluded that the first sale doctrine
cabins the distribution right’s encroachment on the right to alienation.356
In support of its view, the Copyright Office offered the legislative history
of the 1909 Copyright Act.357 The Office conceded the brevity of the
legislative history regarding the first sale doctrine, but stated that
“[r]epeatedly, the congressional reports refer to the ability of the owner of a
material copy to dispose of that copy as he sees fit.”358 In addition, the
Office asserted that because the 1909 Act combined the first sale doctrine
and the distinction between copyright ownership and physical copy
ownership in the same section, it “demonstrate[d] that the concepts are two
sides of the same coin.”359

349. See id.
350. See id.
351. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 97–101.
352. See id. at 86–91.
353. See id. at 86.
354. See id.
355. See id. at 86–87 (“The distribution right, nonetheless, enables the copyright owner to
prevent alienation of the copy—up to a point[:] . . . when ownership of a lawfully made
copy is transferred to another person—i.e., first sale.”).
356. See id. at 86.
357. See id. at 86 n.286, 87.
358. See id. at 86 n.286.
359. See id. at 87.
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By contrast, the Office observed that transfer of a digital copy does not
require physical alienation.360 Instead, picking up where the Information
Infrastructure Task Force left off,361 digital transmission implicates the
“central copyright right” of reproduction.362 In this respect, the Office
claimed that a simple transformation of the first sale doctrine to cover
digital transmissions would not adequately address the balance of public
access and control for creator incentive because the concerns that produced
the first sale doctrine do not apply to digital transfer.363
In summarizing its view of the policy supporting the first sale doctrine,
the Copyright Office concluded by refuting public comments it received in
support of digital first sale expansion.364 The Copyright Office’s report
identified three specific arguments that commenters made under the broad
assertion that a digital first sale doctrine furthers § 109’s purposes: (1) the
first sale doctrine results from a calculation of incentives to create; (2) the
first sale doctrine’s purpose is promoting progress of the arts; and (3) the
first sale doctrine is based on a right of access.365
The Copyright Office quickly refuted the “incentive calculation”
argument because this argument was not present in the first sale doctrine’s
1909 legislative history.366 Even further, the Office claimed that digital
first sale restrictions could harm the market and increase infringement so
that the incentive to create declines.367
Similarly, the Office disposed of the argument that the first sale
doctrine’s purpose is to promote the progress of the arts because this is the
Without further
policy underlying the “entire Copyright Act.”368
explanation, the Office asserted that a more precise purpose exists for the
first sale doctrine.369
The Copyright Office dedicated more time to the final argument that the
first sale doctrine is a proxy for the right of access.370 However, the Office
attributed this argument to the “library associations” and characterized the
argument to state that the scope of the conveyed interest should be the
determinative factor for § 109.371 In other words, the Office viewed the
right of access argument to state that libraries should be permitted to lend
copies regardless of their physical or digital form because libraries do not

360. See id.
361. See supra notes 323–28 and accompanying text.
362. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 87.
363. See id. at 87–88.
364. See id. at 88–91.
365. See id. at 88–89.
366. See id. at 88.
367. See id.
368. See id. at 88–89.
369. See id. at 89. One may be able to deduce that the “more precise purpose[]” is the
right to alienate physical copies. See id. at 87 (“Digital transmission . . . does not implicate
the aliena[tion] of a physical artifact.”).
370. See id. at 89.
371. See id.
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transfer ownership of title in the copy.372 Finally, the Office concluded that
the simple fact that the first sale doctrine results in positive benefits is not
the same as stating those benefits represent Congress’s purpose in enacting
the first sale doctrine.373
B. Can Digital Property Support an Analogue to the First Sale Doctrine?
There are a number of proposed solutions to the problem of digital first
sale doctrine. In characterizing these various solutions, it is helpful to think
of them in terms of what Professor Lawrence Lessig called “modalities of
regulation.”374 Professor Lessig identified four modes of regulation
including (1) the law; (2) social norms; (3) the market; and
(4) architecture.375
First, the law regulates, in one fashion, by dictating acceptable behavior
and punishing those who choose to disobey.376 Second, social norms
function in a matter similar to the law, but social norms are
decentralized.377 Communities, rather than governments, dictate acceptable
behavior and punish those who choose to disobey.378 Third, markets
regulate by price.379 The more expensive it is to accomplish a desired task,
the greater the limit one may encounter in completing that task.380 Finally,
architecture, or the way something is made, regulates as well.381 The
examples provided by Professor Lessig include how a highway that divides
two neighborhoods can limit the amount of integration between the
residents in each neighborhood.382 By contrast, an easily accessible town
square with diverse shops can increase integration between town
residents.383
These categories are not mutually exclusive.384 Instead, Professor Lessig
asserts, “A policy trades off among these four regulatory tools. It selects its
tool depending upon what works best.”385 For digital property, all four
modalities are in play.386 The current solutions for a digital first sale
doctrine can be grouped in three of these modalities: architecture, law, and
market.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 90–91.
374. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 506–11 (1999). Professor Lessig later expanded upon this discussion in
his book Code. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE (2d ed. 2006).
375. See Lessig, supra note 374, at 507.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 507–08.
382. See id.
383. See id.
384. See id. at 508.
385. See id.
386. See id.
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1. Architecture
At the time of the U.S. Copyright’s DMCA-mandated report and after,
scholars proposed the idea of “forward and delete” technology as an
appropriate, structural, digital analogue to the first sale doctrine.387 Under a
forward-and-delete regime, the original purchaser of a copy would transmit
her copy to another user by generating a copy on that user’s computer.388
However, the original purchaser’s copy would be simultaneously deleted
Thus, the net result of forward-and-delete
from her computer.389
technology is one file, despite the reality of two copies.390 Arguably, such
technology “is the legal equivalent of giving, lending, or selling a material
copy in a fixed form.”391
In 2003, Representative Zoe Lofgren of California introduced a bill
entitled the Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003.392 The BALANCE Act
embraced forward-and-delete technology,393 but never reported out of the
House Committee on the Judiciary.394
More recently, companies like ReDigi, Inc. have implemented versions
of forward-and-delete technology.395 Despite claiming protection under the
first sale doctrine,396 copyright holders have already commenced
proceedings against ReDigi.397 At the time of this Note, large questions

387. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at x–xi; see also, e.g., Justin Graham,
Preserving the Aftermarket in Copyrighted Works: Adapting the First Sale Doctrine to the
Emerging Technological Landscape, 2002 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 87; Joseph Gratz, Digital
Book Distribution: The End of the First-Sale Doctrine?, 3 LANDSLIDE, May–June 2011, at 8,
10; Adam W. Sikich, Buyer Beware: The Threat to the First Sale Doctrine in the Digital
Age, 14 J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2011, at 1, 22–23; Matthew J. Turchyn, It Looks Like a Sale; It
Quacks Like a Sale . . . But It’s Not? An Argument for the Application of the Duck Test in
Digital First Sale Doctrine 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 31, 49–56 (2011).
388. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 81–82.
389. See id.
390. See Sikich, supra note 387, at 22.
391. See id. Other commentators have suggested architectural solutions focused on one
medium. For example, Professor Dana B. Robinson suggested implementing a digitally
visible watermark of personal information for digital books that would allow users to
transfer copies between devices, but discourage transfer to a third party. See Dana B.
Robinson, Digital Rights Management Lite: Freeing Ebooks from Reader Devices and
Software, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 152, 160–70 (2012). Beyond privacy concerns resulting from
physical theft or virtual hacking, Professor Robinson’s solution purposely discourages thirdparty transfer. See id.
392. H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003); Bill D. Herman, A Political History of DRM and
Related Copyright Debates, 1987–2012, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 162, 198 (2012).
393. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 925 n.200.
394. See id.
395. See, e.g., REDIGI BETA, https://www.redigi.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2013)
(referring to the website as “The World’s First Pre-Owned Digital Marketplace”).
396. See Is ReDigi Legal? Yes!, REDIGI BETA, https://www.redigi.com/legal (last visited
Feb. 15, 2013).
397. See Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. ReDigi, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00095-RJS (S.D.N.Y. filed
Jan. 6, 2012).
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remain over the effectiveness of forward-and-delete technology like
ReDigi.398
2. Law
If one were to accept the feasibility of forward-and-delete technology,
most commentators agree that simultaneous legislation is necessary. For
example, the BALANCE Act would have amended § 109 to allow a copy
owner to transmit a copy to a single recipient as long as the transferor did
not retain her copy.399
Other commentators have suggested similar amendments.400 Still others
have sought similar access results from changes to other areas of the
Copyright Act401 or judicial interpretation.402 For example, Representative
Rick Boucher of Virginia introduced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights
Act of 2003,403 which would have permitted circumvention of technological
measures that prevent copying as a fair use exception when the
circumvention did not infringe the copyright.404 However, like the
BALANCE Act, this bill died in committee.405 Perhaps a more extreme
example—one that seeks copyright overhaul more generally—can be found
398. See, e.g., Torie Bosch, Court Refuses Music Company Request To Shutter Site
Selling “Used MP3s”—For Now, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2012/02/07/redigi_vs_emi_capitol_records_court_refuses_to_shutter_site
_selling_used_mp3s_for_now_.html (reporting through a third-party that ReDigi’s Chief
Executive Officer, John Ossenmacher, has said that “there’s no way for ReDigi to guarantee
that users who resell music through his service haven’t made copies of their songs and stored
them on some other hard drive”).
399. See H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 925
n.200.
400. See Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1395, 1447–49 (1996) (discussing a proposed amendment that would implement a
digital first sale doctrine, limited to noncommercial use); Sikich, supra note 387, at 23
(proposing an amendment to 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006), that would permit transfer of a
digital file “so long as the technology used by that person to transmit the copy . . . deletes the
work contemporaneously when transmitting the copy”); Turchyn, supra note 387, at 55–56
(stating that “[l]egislation could be the best way to effectuate the implementation of devices
that would allow for a digital First Sale Doctrine”).
401. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 91, 127–37 (2010) (suggesting a regulatory oversight regime designed to protect and
expand user privileges in digital property in place of traditional fair use).
402. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164,
2272–73 (2004) (advocating a property-rule approach, rather than a tort-rule approach, to
access of digital property because a tort-rule approach will encourage technical measures
that are less flexible than legal measures).
403. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003). Boucher introduced a similar bill in 2005 that also
died in committee. See Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 1201 (109th): Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005,
GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/hr1201 (last visited Feb. 15,
2013); see also Herman, supra note 392, at 198.
404. See H.R. 107, § 5; see also Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for
Anticipated Technological Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 180
n.189 (2010).
405. H.R. 107 (108th): Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2003, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/hr107 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013).
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in Professor Tom W. Bell’s argument for return to the original Copyright
Act of 1790.406
3. Market
In the DMCA-mandated report, the Copyright Office rejected expansion
of the first sale doctrine for digital property because “analogy to circulation
of goods in the physical realm . . . [is not] compelling for several
reasons.”407 Instead, it chose a “wait and see” approach.408
First, because digital copies do not degrade over time,409 they are no less
desirable than the original digital file.410 In addition, the traditional barriers
to piracy in the tangible world—“time, space, effort, and cost”—are
eliminated by digital technology.411 For example, in Betamax,412 Universal
Studios and Walt Disney proffered the testimony of William Griffiths to
demonstrate how a consumer would use a VCR.413 Griffiths testified that
he intended both to time-shift, and “to build a library of cassettes.”414
However, Griffiths found it too expensive to maintain a library.415 He
began to erase and reuse the tapes.416 By contrast, digital copies can be
transmitted rapidly with little effort or cost and require only sufficient
computer memory to store.417
In addition to this structural difference between physical and digital
property, the Office identified the difference in transfer. 418 The Copyright
Office observed that the analogy comparing transfer of digital copies to the
circulation of goods in the physical realm ultimately rested on a concept
requiring forward-and-delete technology.419 The Copyright Office asserted
that forward-and-delete technology was unworkable as of the time of the
report.420
The U.S. Copyright Office believed voluntary deletion to be an “open
invitation” for users to engage in undetectable infringement.421 In addition,
406. See Virginia Postrel, A Free-Market Fix for the Copyright Racket, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 29, 2012, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-29/a-free-market-fixfor-the-copyright-racket.html.
407. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 97.
408. See id. at 101; Reese, supra note 40, at 578.
409. See supra notes 312–14 and accompanying text.
410. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 82.
411. See id.
412. Arguably, Betamax is also an example of architectural regulation, insofar as
televised movies differ from their movie theatre counterparts. See supra notes 258–62 and
accompanying text.
413. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax), 464 U.S. 417,
423–24 n.3 (1984).
414. See id.
415. See id.
416. See id.
417. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 82.
418. See id. at 97.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See id.
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the evidentiary burden of establishing simultaneous deletion would be
impossible for either the copyright owner or the alleged infringer.422
Similarly, the U.S. Copyright Office claimed that automatic forward-anddelete technology is not workable for two reasons.423 First, the technology
did not exist at the time of the report.424 Assuming the technology became
available in the future, the Copyright Office explained that it could only
work if it was “robust, persistent, and fairly easy to use.”425 Robust,
persistent, and easily employed technology is expensive—an expense borne
either by the copyright owner or the consumer.426 In both cases, there is
little incentive to utilize such technology.427 In fact, the Copyright Office
observed that there exists no consumer desire for products that function
under the forward-and-delete model.428 In fact, peer-to-peer file sharing
networks like Napster suggest that consumers “wish to retain, not destroy,
the digital copy from which the work is transmitted.”429
In summarizing its distaste for either the voluntary or automatic forwardand-delete technology, the Copyright Office asserted that expansion of the
first sale doctrine ultimately encourages infringement of the reproduction
right through either mistaken belief or a bad faith affirmative defense.430
By contrast, the Copyright Office asserted that Congress’s past behavior
demonstrates a desire to protect the reproduction right at the expense of the
first sale doctrine.431 In implementing the rental amendments,432 the Office
explained that Congress acted on anecdotal evidence of piracy combined
with conditions creating the potential for widespread abuse to restrict the
public’s right to alienation in favor of the copyright owner’s exclusive right
to reproduction.433 Here, the Copyright Office asserted that the same
conditions apply.434 As a result, expanding the first sale doctrine to digital
copies would similarly harm the market.435
In part due to the Copyright Office’s reluctance to recommend action, the
market has developed a licensing framework.436 Despite the issues facing
companies like Netflix, Pandora, and Spotify,437 not all commentators view
a licensing framework to be harmful.438 Professor Reuvan Ashtar proposes
422. See id. at 97–98.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 98.
425. Id.
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. See id. at 84–85.
429. Id. at 85.
430. See id. at 99.
431. See id.
432. See supra notes 241–42, 290–91 and accompanying text.
433. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 99.
434. See id. at 99–100.
435. See id. at 100.
436. See supra notes 1–29 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
438. See, e.g., Reuven Ashtar, Licensing as Digital Rights Management, From the Advent
of the Web to the iPad, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 141, 186–87 (2011); Jonathan C. Tobin,
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that a licensing framework is workable because not all licensing agreements
qualify for protection under the Copyright Act.439 By distinguishing those
licenses that are eligible for protection from those that are not, Professor
Ashtar suggests that a licensing framework could restore the public access
and control for creator incentive balance.440 Similarly, others suggest that a
licensing framework could restore this balance if it is applied primarily to
digital goods, limited to the licensing of works protected by copyright, and
if the license’s terms are fully disclosed to consumers.441
C. A Possible Response: Fighting New Technology with
Newer Technology
On November 17, 2011, IBM filed an application to patent an “Aging
File System.”442
This patent application described “[a] method,
programmed medium and system . . . that provides for the aging of
information and files stored thereon. Digital data stored on the aging file
systems ages appropriately as would normal paper or photographs without
the need for an external application.”443 IBM’s aging file system uses
various parameters including, for example, “ambient temperature, rate of
aging, [and] simulated type of paper” that are input at the time of
configuration.444 IBM’s patent application lists among the purposes of the
aging file system to automatically and selectively age files for time-limited
record retention purposes.445
IBM’s patent application describes its method as working on either a
single personal computer or a series of computers connected through a
network to a server.446 In either case, the aging file system employs a code
to receive original digital copies, determine their file type, create an aged
file according to the file type and preset aging parameters, and replace the
stored file and associated file metadata.447 Essentially, IBM’s patent
application appears to describe a process that would automatically replace

Licensing As a Means of Providing Affordability and Accessibility in Digital Markets:
Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 167, 187
(2011).
439. See Ashtar, supra note 438, at 186–87.
440. See id.
441. See, e.g., I. Neel Chatterjee, Imperishable Intellectual Creations: The Limits of the
First Sale Doctrine, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 419–25 (1995)
(suggesting the use of compulsory commercial blanket licensing); Tobin, supra note 438, at
184–87 (proposing a licensing framework that “follows the principle that such licenses must
be crafted to maximize accessibility, privacy and transactional clarity”).
442. Aging File System, U.S. Patent No. 20110282838 (filed Nov. 17, 2011), available at
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2
Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PG01&s1=2011
0282838.PGNR.&OS=DN/20110282838RS=DN/20110282838.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. See id.
446. See id.
447. See id.

2013]

CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT

2007

files with their aged versions.448 The degree of aging would be based upon
predetermined variables.449
IBM’s aging file system may immediately serve those who want to
preserve files for a certain period of time but wish to retain storage space by
destroying these files once this period expires.450 Additionally, IBM’s
aging file system may help introduce to digital property a characteristic that
made the first sale doctrine successful in physical property: degradation.451
III. AN ARCHITECTURAL SOLUTION: INTRODUCING
DEGRADATION INTO THE DIGITAL FILE
In its report, the Copyright Office asserted that the tangible nature of the
copy is not a “mere relic,” but rather a “defining element” of the first sale
doctrine.452 This assertion is difficult to deny. The Bobbs-Merrill Co.
Court set forth the first sale doctrine in a post-Cady and Gladding world.453
Under the Cady and Gladding precedent, the incorporeal copyright and
tangible property right are separate.454 However, in the world of the BobbsMerrill Co. Court, a copyright holder could only realize the value of her
copyright by using tangible property.455
A. Harmonizing the Copyright Office’s Interpretation of the First Sale
Doctrine with the Doctrine’s Historical Place in Copyright Law Generally
For these reasons, the Copyright Office’s report is correct to focus on the
material nature of the copy at issue in Bobbs-Merrill Co. and discussed in
the legislative history of the 1909 Copyright Act.456 Nevertheless, limiting
one’s interpretation of the policies supporting the first sale doctrine in this
manner ignores not just the policies promoted by the first sale doctrine
since its inception,457 but the more than three hundred years of history
preceding it.458
Given the ease of digital copying, an unbounded digital first sale doctrine
“would be saying . . . that the exclusive right to make any given work of art
necessarily belonged to the person who happened to become the owner of”
448. See id.
449. See id.
450. See id.; see also, e.g., Michele C.S. Lange, Electronic Evidence & The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, in RECORD RETENTION AND DESTRUCTION CURRENT BEST PRACTICES 31,
31 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2003) (“[T]he reality is that outdated email, antiquated files, and
archival data stored on backup tapes or disks are often kept for months or years past their
useful life. Case law reveals that unwieldy preservation of all electronic data and email
created in the course of business can come back to haunt a corporation when litigation
ensues.”).
451. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
452. See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 207–25 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 189–206 and accompanying text.
455. See supra Part II.A.1.
456. See supra notes 353–59 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 41–116 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 121–206 and accompanying text.
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a computer.459 But failing to expand it disserves the primary goal of
copyright law—deriving general benefits for the public from the effort of
creators460—by limiting public access.
Viewing the first sale doctrine in its historical context461 demonstrates
that it is, in fact, a statement involved in the calculation of incentives to
create.462 While this is in contrast to the Copyright Office’s report,463 it is
true because the first sale doctrine promotes public access and thus limits
creators’ control just like the limited monopoly created by England’s
Statute of Anne464 and adopted in the United States.465
Insofar as Congressional amendments to the first sale doctrine have
narrowed its scope,466 these amendments should be viewed in context.
With the Record Rental and Computer Software Rental Amendments,
Congress responded to the threat of widespread piracy through the use of
preexisting technology.467 By contrast, when given the opportunity to
respond in a less-restrictive manner, Congress has done so. The AHRA
represents congressional action at the inception of new technology that did
not infringe upon the first sale doctrine.468 Similarly, albeit implicitly,
when the product has built-in piracy deterrents like recording broadcast
television by VCR at issue in Betamax, Congress has not acted at all.469
Perhaps at the time of the U.S. Copyright Office’s report, a “wait and
see” approach was appropriate. But now that more than a decade has
brought with it new technology, it is time to reconsider whether expanding
the first sale doctrine to digital property is possible.
B. Using Digital Property’s Characteristic Differences from
Physical Property To Restore the Balance Between
Public Access and Creator Incentive
Under Professor Lessig’s classification system, the physical first sale
doctrine is a legal solution that benefits from its architecture.470 The
composition of physical property helps the physical first sale doctrine work.
First, physical property degrades over time.471 This means that a purchaser
who repeatedly alienates her copy may find it less valuable over time. The
459. Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528, 530 (1852); see supra note 201 and
accompanying text.
460. Betamax, 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) (“[T]he primary object in conferring the [limited
copyright] monopoly [is] . . . the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see supra note 262 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 121–206 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 366–67 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 351–56 and accompanying text.
464. See supra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
465. See supra notes 167–87 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 231–42, 290–91, 431–33 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 231–42, 290–91, 431–33 and accompanying text.
468. See supra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 256–62 and accompanying text.
470. See supra notes 374–86 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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physical degradation may cause the purchaser to stop alienating her copy, or
even further, replace her copy. Second, due to issues of time, space, effort,
and cost, physical property is harder to duplicate.472 As a result, the
financial cost, time, space, and effort of making physical copies dissuades
potential pirates.473
Solutions offered for expanding the first sale doctrine to digital property
have focused exclusively on replicating the second aspect of the first sale
doctrine.474 Forward-and-delete technology seeks to remedy the harm to
the copyright holder caused by copying by looking to the net result.475
Statutory amendments seek to redefine and narrow what sort of copying the
government considers harmful to the copyright holder.476 A market
solution purports to allow the parties to define what type of copying is
harmful.477
Absent a cheap, robust, persistent, and user-friendly technology—the
characteristics the U.S. Copyright Office identified as necessary for
implementing forward-and-delete technology478—digital copies are easy to
duplicate.479 Fighting this characteristic may be futile.480 Perhaps the
better solution focuses on the other architectural characteristic that permits
the physical first sale doctrine to function effectively: degradation.481
IBM’s aging file system technology allows for automatic aging of digital
property based upon various parameters.482 Using the ease of digital
copying as an element in this aging system may prove to be the most
effective balance of public access and control for creative incentive in
digital property currently available.
For example, a regulatory regime that implemented an aging file system
for digital property could use the number of times a file is copied as a
parameter to accelerate file aging. Because the aging file system identifies
and replaces metadata as well, it could conceivably identify an original
copy and all of its duplicative progeny. As a result, the purchaser would be
able to make a certain number of copies before perceiving degradation
throughout all these copies. However, the more copies created, the faster
the digital copy would degrade. Just like a physical copy that is loaned out
a number of times, a digital copy duplicated frequently would degrade
quickly across all copies.

472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

See supra notes 411–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 411–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 387–441 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 387–98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 399–405 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 407–41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 425–29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 410–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 397–98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 443–44 and accompanying text.
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The proposed solution is not without its pitfalls. First, determining a
reasonable number of copies before degradation would likely require
market research and, possibly, congressional hearings.
Second, because digital copies are created as part of an essential step in
accessing the copy on a computer,483 consideration must be paid to
determining whether these copies would factor in the aging parameters.
One argument for including these copies is that private use of physical
copies still factors into a physical copy’s degradation. Book spines are
bent, DVDs are scratched, and CDs are misplaced without ever changing
hands. One argument against including these copies is that pausing a DVD,
putting a book down, or rewinding a CD generally does not factor in this
degradation.
Perhaps, a compromise would be that copies of a certain file size would
be considered in the aging parameters. In other words, copies of digital
files that are the size of a normal buffer file when streaming media online
would not count in aging parameters, but those exceeding this size would
count.484 In addition, copies made to RAM would not count, but those
made to other discs or from storage discs to hard drives would count.485
Third, users may seek to evade the aging file system by implementing
firewalls or disconnecting from the internet. Other provisions already
contained in the DMCA may possibly address anti-aging file system
firewalls.486 Simply disconnecting from the internet would lead users to
revert to physical transfer through portable drives or storage discs. These
transactions would likely involve the same discouraging financial cost,
time, space, and effort of physical copying.487
Certainly, there may be other pitfalls. For example, like forward-anddelete technology, the cost of implementing such a system is uncertain.
Additionally, a statutory amendment defining a digital copy488 and
including it in the first sale doctrine, if not necessary, would certainly be
desirable.489 However, an aging file system better aligns digital files with
their physical counterparts. Even further, an aging file system uses
copying—digital property’s strength—as a deterrent to better balance public
access and control for creator incentive. If Congress adopted a regime
employing an aging file system, online streaming media companies would
have the option of purchasing copies from private consumers or other
483. See supra notes 325–31 and accompanying text.
484. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 329–30 and accompanying text.
486. See supra note 321 (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006), the DMCA’s
anticircumvention provision).
487. See supra notes 411–16 and accompanying text.
488. This Note proposes that adopting the AHRA’s definition would likely suffice. See
supra notes 243–47 and accompanying text.
489. This Note proposes that simply amending the current text of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a)
(2006) as follows is likely sufficient: “[T]he owner of a particular copy[,] . . . phonorecord[,
or digital copy] lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the
possession of that copy[,] . . . phonorecord[, or digital copy].”
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digital marketplaces. In addition, these companies would be able to
generate revenue beyond subscription fees and advertisements by alienating
digital copies that may generate demand, but not justify the cost of
perpetual storage on their servers, reminiscent of the neighborhood record
or video store’s bargain bin.

